THE NEW REPUBLIC

Breaking Up CIA

The President's prompt decision following his election to reappoint Allen W. Dulles as chief of the Central Intelligence Agency was no great surprise. Dulles, like J. Edgar Hoover, had come to be one of those pillars of the Republic that no President and no Congress could remove easily. Mr. Kennedy spoke privately then of putting in as Deputy to Mr. Dulles a man of his own who would, within not too many months after the transition from one Administration to another, move up as Director. For his part, Mr. Dulles expressed the belief that his continued presence would symbolize the non-partisan character of intelligence. But with the collapse after Cuba of public confidence in the competence of CIA, the untouchability of the Agency came to an end. The House Rules Committee is toying with the idea of a full-scale investigation. Sen. Eugene McCarthy has introduced a resolution reviving earlier proposals for some kind of Congressional watchdog (the CIA is the only agency whose books are not open either to the General Accounting Office or to regular Congressional scrutiny). An eight-member Presidential advisory group headed by Dr. James Killian is said to be studying a fundamental reorganization of US intelligence which might conceivably, among other things, break up the CIA altogether. Some consideration has even been given to what might be done in the event of drastic reorganization with the CIA's mammoth and highly visible new headquarters on the Virginia side of the Potomac. Before the summer is out Allen Dulles will probably be out too, though he may be permitted to fade away on a leave of absence. The CIA role in the Cuban disaster is not, however, solely responsible for the contemplated reforms. The White House has been careful not to single out CIA as the scapegoat. There have been stories inspired by membe

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Some Choose Fear

★ "We must choose between freedom and fear – we cannot have both," wrote Zechariah Chafee in 1956. He went on to say that if citizens choose fear the real rulers of the country will be fanatics "fired with a zeal to save grown men from objectionable ideas by putting them under the care of official nursemaids."

The advocates of fear were aided, we think, by two 5-4 decisions by the Supreme Court last week virtually outlawing the Communist Party. Theoretically the Party can still teach overthrow of the government but not teaching that can be interpreted as "incitement." Probably the high court can understand the distinction but we doubt if lower courts and the FBI can. The decisions, we think, open the door a little wider for the witch-hunters just when world tension is a little greater.

Kennedy on crutches is back in Washington. Before flying to Florida he told the nation about his talks with Khrushchev. Kennedy spoke somberly. Only the insensitive failed to understand that he was trying to convey the grim mood of Vienna. It was not comforting for timid spirits. Many would prefer the lulling tones of Eisenhower. Things were getting worse then, but people felt better. Kennedy might have raged against "godless Communism" – that would have channeled anxiety into the relief of hatred. Or he could have uttered hopeful platitudes: that would have pleased the sleeping pill addicts. Instead he spoke quietly and candidly and did not pretend there are immediate solutions.

How does this leave the choice between freedom and fear? Every time strain increases it helps to revive subsurface hysteria. The John Birch Society is not important in itself but again reveals the compulsion in some to choose fear. (Little Finland knows danger, it lives within the curl of the Bear's paw. Yet it has chosen freedom; it has not outlawed, for example, the Communist Party.)

The Court majority has further attenuated the old Brandeis-Holmes distinction between physical *acts* to overthrow the government (illegal) and *teaching* the moral rightness of ultimate overthrow (legal). Thomas Jefferson taught the latter. The Court majority thinks the distinction is still there. Douglas and Black doubt it.

The new rulings incidentally revive the all but moribund Subversive Activities Control Board. That 5-man agency established under the 1950 McCarran Act (over Truman's veto) decides whether trade unions are Communist-infiltrated and whether organizations are officially "Communist fronts." Its members draw $20,000-a-year salaries. We had all but forgotten them in their quiet hide-away. Twice before courts slapped down their efforts to proscribe the Communist Party; this time they have succeeded. We shall be hearing more of them from now on.

Burden of the Cities

★ The first world conference of mayors opens here this week; it finds American cities in a sorry plight. The normal US city is the step-child of the state legislature and is turning in increasing desperation to Washington. Efficiency of city governments, while not perfect, is enormously improved since 1900. But US cities have an increasing burden as people move into them (70 percent of all citizens now live in urban areas). School costs soar but city revenue sources (mostly property and sales taxes) prove less and less adequate.

It will astonish most people to compare the rate at which state-local debt is increasing with federal debt. The official comparison is compiled by the Commerce Department. Federal debt for this purpose omits IOU's which the government holds itself (as in social security). Federal debt rose to a 1945 postwar peak of $252.7 billions. By mid-1960 it was $241 billion (less than the war peak). By contrast, state-local debt was $13.7 billion when the war ended when most cities had postponed urgent improvements. By mid-June, 1960, it had jumped to $60 billion.

The fact is, our cities are in a bad way. The voter generally knows only about his *own* city and does not see the general situation. Increasing grants from Washington keep many cities solvent.

A curious feature is the role of inflation in all this. Last week the budget director of NYC wrote a letter to the *NYTimes* boasting that Mayor Wagner was borrowing on a buy-now-pay-later basis. The *Times* took a dim view of this and commented editorially, "When you don't pay cash the cost of government is higher no matter how you juggle the upside-down arguments."

Neither side specifically mentioned inflation. But it is important in any long-term debt. If the city borrowed in 1910 and paid back now it hired expensive dollars and paid back cheap dollars. Prices have averaged an increase of 2 1/3 percent a year over the past 60 years. (In most countries it has been higher.) This may be no excuse for the NYC policy but it deserves to be considered. Of course it works both ways. The man whose $20,000 annuity comes due finds it won't buy what he had expected when he made the contract 25 years earlier. Here it is the insurance company that received expensive dollars and pays back cheap ones.

Reality Crashed In

★ Gerald Johnson's review of the new book on Borah by Marian McKenna last week brought back old memories. On the night of Pearl Harbor we stood with a little group of subdued reporters on the portico of the White House in the shade of the columns, shivering with history. FDR had called in the Foreign Relations Committee and we interviewed them briefly one by one as they arrived. All but Borah.

His leonine face was set and grim. He had called it a "phony war" – and he had better information than the State Department. And now reality had crashed in. We all admired him; there was strength and greatness about him. But he had been ruined in an afternoon. A servant let him in. Not one of us said a word.

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Breaking Up CIA

dent's staff suggesting that the Pentagon is as much if not more to blame. In our view it is of special importance to recognize that the case for the abolition of CIA and for a general reorganization of US intelligence rests on something more substantial than one isolated instance of spectacular misjudgment and mismanagement in Cuba. What emerges from post-mortems on the events of April 19 is not that CIA so openly bungled. It is that CIA had in effect been entrusted with broad responsibility for US policy which properly belonged in the State Department. This had been true under Eisenhower, but the President-elect did not disturb the arrangement. The fact that Mr. Kennedy was unable to find a satisfactory Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and that Mr. Adolf Berle had been operating out of the White House as a kind of interim Assistant Secretary – a set-up that will end now that Dean Carl B. Spaeth of the Stanford Law School has accepted the post – meant that CIA was not subject even to the nominal operating check of the responsible regional authority in the State Department. Still, it would probably have made little difference had Mr. Spaeth been selected in February rather than last week, for the power of the CIA to venture forth on its own without reference to any larger purposes of our foreign policy had come to seem natural and proper. The CIA's preponderance in resources (an estimated annual budget of not less than $500 million and quite possibly $1 billion, as compared with a *requested* total budget of $247,013,610 for State in 1961) was reinforced by the disposition of Foster Dulles to rely more on the judgments cast up by his brother's labyrinthine apparatus than on his own State Department expertise.

This phenomenon was noted previously by *The New Republic* and will be the subject of further comment next week, because it is here that the Cuban experience has been most revealing. It is one thing to say that the CIA proved incompetent but quite another to suggest that Cuba uncovered a state of dangerous disarray in our whole process of foreign policy planning. If it were thought that the President need only tighten up CIA operations, then a few firings and some tinkering with the structure – such as transferring operational responsibility for para-military activities to another jurisdiction – would suffice. But if the President's problem is how intelligence should fit into a new scheme of policy formulation, then the need for more fundamental reorganization becomes plainer.

It is not yet clear how the Kennedy Administration sees the problem. Some in CIA have talked privately to newsmen about plans of the Agency to move into its new quarters in September – as if to say that nothing much will change. And nothing of consequence *has* by

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all accounts changed since Cuba inside the CIA. (One learns of an anti-Castro Cuban who got a phone call two weeks ago from the CIA. He was given a message by a secretary from "Mr. Bender" – the agent who had been in charge of the landing and a man widely known to be anathema to the Cuban in question – only to get another call an hour later informing him that the message had really come from Mr. So and So, and that "Mr. Bender" no longer had anything to do with Cuban matters! Where, one wonders, is "Mr. Bender" now?)

We can appreciate that the President and his advisers may wish to proceed cautiously, lest the baby be lost with the bathwater. They may be in no hurry to dismantle the intelligence operation we have until it is clear what should take its place, after which new appointments can sensibly be made. One encouraging sign is that the much-publicized report submitted last week by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor on the narrow issue of relocating para-military operations outside of CIA is not to be the last word. More sweeping recommendations are to come from the Killian Committee, which has been meeting quietly with an eye to a July 1 deadline. It should be noted, however, that this is a citizens' group which has been able to get together at most once a week, which has no staff to speak of, and which has somewhat imprecisely defined terms of reference. Though its members are all estimable men, many of them are carry-overs from a precursor committee, established by President Eisenhower, which looked on without sounding any very noisy alarum at what was happening over the years in CIA. In a certain sense, these men are now being asked to investigate their own past performance. One trusts that the President will supplement their recommendations with some independent-minded staff work and with a much wider range of consultation in and out of government.

Berlin: To Talk or Not to Talk

Mr. Khrushchev's memorandum to the President in effect asks for *de facto* recognition of the division of Germany and for a new statute guaranteeing a neutral and demilitarized West Berlin. Khrushchev wants to accomplish this by negotiation among the Great Powers; in the event this is rejected, by negotiation between the West German and East German Governments. If neither is possible, he is prepared to go it alone and turn over Soviet occupation rights in Berlin to the East German regime. Khrushchev states that he will not insist on the "immediate withdrawal" of either Germany from its military alliances; nor does he "link the conclusion of a peace treaty with the recognition of the German Democratic Republic" by the United States.

Secretary Rusk has said no. Dr. Adenauer and Willy Brandt have said never. But the matter will not rest there. US policy for more than a decade has been based on the possibility of a Soviet "roll-back" in Europe. This in turn has rested on one of two assumptions: either the willingness of the Soviet Union to permit German reunification through free elections (that is to say, the end of a Communist regime in any part of Germany) or, a successful internal uprising in the East which would, in effect, have the same result. Both assumptions are now fantastic.

Why does the prospect of a Soviet surrender of occupation rights so frighten us? The answer, of course, is that we would then be expected to deal with the East German authorities (or, as we call them, "Soviet agents"). These "agents" might throw roadblocks across the lines of communication to Berlin. Thereafter, they might try to take over the city by force. All this is possible, but it is not a new prospect; it is no more fearful than what we have been living with since the end of World War II. The Russians could at any time have pinched off Berlin, had they wished to risk a war, or had they been able to persuade the people of West Berlin to abandon their partiality for the West. In the last analysis, all that we have ever been able to do to deter the Russians from absorbing Berlin was to threaten to go to war. That deterrence, for what it is worth, would be just as convincing to East German authorities as to Russian. As for access to Berlin, why would that be put in any greater jeopardy by having East Germans at the control points?

We may be determined that there shall be no change, but if the Russians wish to alter their own relations with East Germany, and thus Berlin, we cannot prevent it. The only practical question worth considering, therefore, is whether a change could be made that would leave the West no weaker in Berlin than it is now. And its present position now *is* weak – not only because of our reluctance to wage a conventional war in Europe, but because our claim that no power may unilaterally terminate its occupation rights in Berlin – after 15 years – flies in the face of common sense.

Mr. Khrushchev knows, at least he has been told often enough, that the US does not intend to deliver the West Berliners to Communism. That is not what is at issue. What is at issue, as Mr. Khrushchev put it in his memorandum, is what "other measures . . . could guarantee the freedom and independence of West Berlin as a free, demilitarized city." Or as Walter Lippmann reported after his talks with Khrushchev in April, "whether or not we say that the freedom of West Berlin, to which we are pledged, can be maintained only by refusal to negotiate about this future."

It will take courage for Mr. Kennedy to look at this problem coolly. It will take courage because, partly as a result of popular frustration over Cuba, Laos and the

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unmistakable appearance of the decline of American power, there are influential journalists (for whom the editorials in *Life* magazine speak) and influential Congressmen who are itching for a showdown, somewhere, somehow. As a high-ranking military officer said of Berlin privately in Washington recently: "Maybe we need a little blood-letting." This mood is pervasive, dangerous and irrational.

Dr. Adenauer, who is certainly a Great European, is the other pressure point on the President. Bluntly, the Adenauer line is that any change would sap the confidence of Germans in the West and prepare the way for a German-Soviet deal. This attitude has not prevented the Chancellor from having since 1951 his own, *ad hoc* relations with the East Germans for the purpose of facilitating interzonal trade and communications between the two Germanys.

It is both honorable and prudent for the United States to champion the freedom of West Berliners and open access to and from their city. It is also sensible to prepare, as we are preparing, contingency plans for enforcing our right of access if it is forcibly denied. But it does not automatically follow that we should refuse to consider any new arrangement for guaranteeing an independent status for, or unhindered communication with, Berlin. Firmness does not require standing firm on a defensive position taken 15 years ago. Senator Kennedy took a more realistic view last year when interviewed by this journal prior to his nomination: "Khrushchev has to understand that we'll talk in the hope of improving the status of Berlin – on that basis we'll negotiate, not to lessen their security."

Stranded on the Beach

In destroying the relatively small landing force at the Bay of Pigs, Castro dealt a painful blow to the morale of 52,000 Cuban exiles in South Florida. Most of those who have come here in the past two years belong to the middle class, the people who initially supported Castro's July 26th Movement. Their skills in professions and business hardly prepare them for the jobs open to refugees. Of those who have gone north, most have returned to Miami, where the task of supporting a family is proving nearly impossible. The 4,000 families on relief receive an average of only $75 a month.

Outside of an improbable swift defeat of Castro, there is no entirely satisfactory solution to the Cuban refugee problem. A suggestion by a Dade County Commissioner that the World War II Navy air base at Opalaka be reopened to accommodate 15,000 exiles was immediately vetoed by the refugees and by federal officials who fear the continuing dangers of DP camps.

The Kennedy Administration, which feels so keenly its responsibility for those who landed on the beach in Cuba and were captured – cannot be indifferent either to those who stayed behind. So long as the refugees are not integrated into the American work force, relief stipends beyond the present $75 level must be provided. The exiles are as much a casualty of the abortive landing as the "cream of Cuba's youth," or the thousands of suspected rebel sympathizers Castro has imprisoned in recent months.

Choice for Portugal

The African revolt in Angola has reached dimensions far exceeding any earlier rising on that continent except perhaps in Algeria, and the Portuguese authorities' only response has been savage brutality. Reliable reports are hard to come by, since no foreign correspondents are allowed in the area of the fighting, but missionaries recently returned from Angola tell of indiscriminate mass shootings, often in places miles from the scene of the trouble. So far the rising seems to be confined to the northern tribes near the Congo frontier, but in the south thousands of Africans have been thrown into concentration camps.

On April 20 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution by 73 votes to 2 which called on Portugal to introduce reforms into Angola and set up a subcommittee of five to report on the situation to the Security Council as soon as possible. But a five-nation, UN committee of inquiry was not appointed until May 22, and Russia has made great play of the failure of the Secretariat and the Chairman of the Assembly to move more quickly. The Portuguese have given no sign of their readiness to permit this committee of inquiry to enter the troubled area, and the situation is particularly urgent since the rainy season in Angola has just ended and the Portuguese are believed to be preparing even more drastic measures of repression.

Last week the United Nations Security Council in a remarkable show of accord (9 to 0, with Britain and France abstaining) gave another turn to the screw, calling on Portugal to "extend every facility" to the UN committee and to "desist forthwith from repressive measures." So far, the revolt seems to be led by pro-Western elements. But continued repression on the present scale will force the nationalists to accept help wherever it is offered. For this reason apart from all others, the US has the strongest possible interest in facing Portugal with the clear choice between changing its policy in Angola or leaving the Western alliance – for her present military contribution is trifling compared with the political damage her membership will do to the West if her policy in Angola unites the whole of Afro-Asia against her.

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This Introspective Island

London

Mr. Kennedy passed through a curious and inwardly vulnerable London that has been less concerned to know what he thought of Mr. Khrushchev than what he thought, and may continue to think, of Britain. This growing national sensitivity has seldom been so nervously betrayed. Greeting the President at the airport, Mr. Macmillan for once seemed strangely flappable: his brief speech contrived to be both avuncular and entreating. If Mr. Kennedy had spoken then, or afterwards, the easy, familiar and reassuring words that most of his listeners wished, in their heart of hearts, to hear he would have done Britain very little service. But no hint of the "special relationship," the "essential alliance" or any of the nostalgic and increasingly meaningless phrases that have shored up Britain's view of its partnership with the United States these past 20 years, escaped from Mr. Kennedy in London. He had come, he insisted, to see the Radziwills as much as any other subjects of her Majesty.

This reticence, precise and polite, may prove the most effective diplomatic stroke of any that the President attempted during his week in Europe. It cut short the final, lingering illusion of the British public that they could somehow have the decision on whether or not to enter Europe taken from them. Mr. Eisenhower might have comforted them: Mr. Kennedy did not. The message came through instantly that the new President was less than sentimental over the Anglo-Saxon past: so the wooing of General de Gaulle had been in earnest. But the crowds, whatever their doubts of this unpredictable and unpunctual young man, stayed animated and intrigued to the end. Without encouragement from the papers (which had printed street maps of Mr. Eisenhower's routes through the town in 1959) and uncertain even of the time of the Presidential arrival, some 250,000 Londoners turned out from Hammersmith Broadway to Buckingham Place (the Radziwill home) at dusk on Sunday. This is some five times the audience that an affair like the well-publicized Aldermaston march mustered in London this year.

The deepening political preoccupation over Britain's entry into Europe, which has begun minor civil strife inside both Labour and Conservative ranks, served to muffle the impact in Britain of Mr. Kennedy's journey to Vienna. Eurovision (the television link that joins networks between London and Moscow) is strong on ceremonial, weak on diplomatic reporting. And so it came as a surprise that the two Presidents in Paris apparently thought it necessary to warn Mr. Khrushchev off Berlin. There were sudden and awful surmises that, as over Laos and the nuclear test ban, the British preference for negotiation and flexibility would again make Mr. Macmillan the odd man out. The result in Vienna, shelving Berlin until after the West German elections in September, making Laos the chief and sole test of Soviet intentions, and quietly dropping the nuclear test talks that only Britain has been very anxious to pursue, came therefore as something of a relief. The sky, as usual, had not fallen. The conclusion that has been drawn in London is that Mr. Khrushchev sees a political advantage for himself in drawing Mr. Kennedy to a Moscow meeting this autumn and will make no importunate demands on the West before then. Mr. Macmillan, equally, looks for a helpful visit from the President, not too long after the British bid to enter Europe or too distant from the next election.

London has accepted, by and large, that the associations of wartime carry weight no longer in the White House. The appointment of David Ormsby-Gore, the one sprig of the Macmillan family on personal-name terms with both Jack and Harold, to be ambassador in Washington is a first attempt to catch up with the new times. There is an official feeling that the anti-Polaris demonstrations have had more publicity than they deserve: which may be why the foreign secretary, Lord Home, is accepting transatlantic invitations this month. Whether all this will add up to a serious attempt to sell the British conception of coexistence with both Moscow and Peking is doubtful. It could as easily lapse into an anxious-to-please obedience, particularly if General de Gaulle refuses to ease Britain's entry into the Common Market in the coming months. Whatever its reluctance London now has to try to come to terms with Paris and Bonn. The pro-Europeans in Britain are keeping their fingers crossed that the President will not come this way again, the innocent reviver of old hankerings and wishfulnesses, until after Mr. Macmillan has steeled himself for the plunge into Europe.

ALASTAIR BURNET

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Complications in Colombia

According to an agreement signed by the Liberal and Conservative Parties four years ago, Colombia is to be governed until 1974 by a system of "alternation," with major offices passing regularly from one party to the other. Under the leadership of President Lleras Camargo, a Liberal of towering ability, integrity and prestige, the system has so far produced excellent results: political peace, a slowing down of the backwoods banditry that has slain 500,000 people since 1948 (out of a population of 14 million), the development of light industries (notably textiles and aluminum), and important increases in the production of cotton, sugar, tobacco and beef.

These encouraging prospects are now darkened by the approaching end of Lleras' term. The Conservatives, who by Constitutional amendment are to have the Presidency in 1962 are seriously split. No agreement on a single candidate seems possible, and if two Conservatives run next March the Liberals will be tempted to use this as an excuse to ignore the principle of alternation. The recent release from prison of Conservative ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla further complicates matters; Rojas is old, ailing, and officially deprived of all political rights, but he has enough of a following in some rural areas to be a potential nuisance.

The Liberals, led by Vice President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, are similarly troubled with factionalism. The party platform calls for a moderate, compensated agrarian reform, similar to the one now in operation in Venezuela, but the dissident Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL) favors a radical Castro-style takeover. The MRL, formed only a few years ago by Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, a wealthy lawyer and son of a famous Liberal politician, now has 16 of the 152 seats in Congress, and got one-fifth of the Liberal vote in the last election. Lopez Michelson, who has the support of the small, illegal, but organizationally powerful Communist Party, declares his followers not bound by the alternation agreement, and recently announced that he would present himself as an unconstitutional candidate for the Presidency next year.

Colombian politics are made still more unstable by the influence and example of Castro. The Cuban Embassy in Bogota is a source of funds, personnel and anti-Yankee propaganda, and MRL leaders regularly make pilgrimages to Havana; Gloria Gaitan, MRL daughter of a Liberal politician whose assassination in 1948 touched off civil war, was in Fidel Castro's entourage during this year's May Day celebration. Cuban influence in Colombia, which for some time appeared to be dying out, was sharply revived by the unsuccessful US-backed invasion this April; US Embassy windows were smashed, and the USIS binational center forced to close. President Lleras, who has taken an absolute stand in favor of non-intervention since his service as first Secretary General of the OAS (1947-53), was genuinely shocked; although strongly opposed to Castroism, he did not issue any statement rebuking the pro-Castro mob that raged through his capital in the wake of the landing at the Bay of Cochinos.

In Colombia, as elsewhere in Latin America, Castro's appeal comes not from his own erratic, pro-Communist behavior, but from what one Colombian official admits is "the subhuman level of life of a majority of our people." In the booming cities of Cali, Medellin and Bogota, there is the same sad contrast between handsome new office buildings and apartment houses and the wretched shacks from which the ordinary worker looks out on sordid surroundings.

An overwhelming majority of the nation's 700,000 rural proprietors own from one to five acres of land apiece, postage-stamp-sized holdings from which only the meagerest of existence can be scratched; three-quarters of the farm population is illiterate. The Agrarian Reform Bill, introduced in Congress last October, is still bottled up by party rivalry and pressure from the big landowners. The economy remains dangerously dependent on coffee exports, which bring in about 70 percent of all foreign exchange; coffee prices have fallen from 80 cents a pound in 1954 to 44 cents today, and each decline of one cent costs Colombia about $8 million. Per capita income of about $200 a year is far below that of pre-Castro Cuba, and social inequality, complicated by racial problems, is at least as great.

If internal reforms and the Alliance for Progress do not improve conditions fairly soon, the appeal of Castroism may prove irresistible.

By the Side of the Road

Those with an eye for unblemished landscape hoped that the Congress, when it first approved a mammoth highway building program (14,000 miles and costing about $41 billion), would impose an absolute ban on highway advertising. It did not, but in 1958 it approved a two-year, optional billboard control program which expires on the 30th of this month and which the President has asked be extended for another four years. That act offered to increase a state's fiscal allotment by one-half of one percent in the event that state said "no" to the billboard lobby. To qualify for this incentive bonus, states have to meet certain requirements laid down by the federal government and sign specific agreements with the Federal Bureau of Roads.

But while nine states have passed the appropriate legislation, only two, Maryland and North Dakota, have thus far picked up the government option. Federal specifications are not drastic: primarily, they ban outdoor signboards for 660 feet of the right of way in rural

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areas. Even this requirement may soon be pointless for one manufacturer has started building massive billboards that are 80 by 100 feet, suspended high in the sky by guy wires. The billboard lobby's first and most important victory was in initially convincing Congress that regulation was superfluous and, in the same breath, that the states could handle a situation better because they are closer to the scene. Once the optional arrangement had been approved, the lobbyists' Jeffersonianism was unbounded. Now they've become staunch "county righters" and "town righters."

Senator Kefauver Persists

As was expected, corporate witnesses at the Kefauver hearings on electrical equipment price-fixing have explained their errancy in terms of deficient "internal communications." Both GE and Westinghouse have lately initiated procedures to acquaint price-setting executives with the requirements of antitrust law, and to ensure periodic statements of allegiance to corporate policies based on the law. These efforts to communicate top management's avowed commitment to the competitive ideal are offered as evidence of good intentions, obviating any need for new legislation. Since Secretary of Commerce Hodges has given this view a kind of official sanction by espousing it in his testimony before the Congress, it can no longer be dismissed as just an attempt by a self-interested group to get public opinion and Congress off its back. Yet that is all it is.

"Good Gracious, You Mean To Say Something's Been Going on Here for 50 Years?"

From the statements of the convicted executives, it is hardly disputable that the violations occurred not because of ignorance of the law, but because the men involved had a higher loyalty to personal status, high incomes and corporate positions. They acted, as some of them frankly said, "for the good of the firm." And after all, did not David Lilienthal write an encomium of *Big Business* in which he urged, in effect, the abandonment of efforts to preserve price competition? Many executives feel, as one of the convicted ones said, that price-fixing "is the only way a business can be run. It is free enterprise."

What most large firms seek is security from competition, euphemistically called "stabilization." Price-fixing is an effective means to this end. Division managers of large corporations are rated primarily by the profitability of their operations, and so long as men's careers depend on attaining a given profit quota, no amount of mere exhortation from above will prevent their conspiring to control the market. It will take more than "internal communication" to prevent undercover violations of the antitrust laws.

The interest of the corporation which has been found guilty is in sweeping the scandal under the rug. But the public's interest in the Kefauver hearings is in whether additional legislation or new enforcement procedures are needed? Proposals now under discussion in the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee would make top officers of corporations responsible for violations by subordinates; make jail sentences mandatory; and make identical bidding prima-facie evidence of conspiracy. These at least merit full debate.

Wonder-Working Power

Four years ago, Indiana farmers representing virtually all the state's Rural Electrification cooperatives asked for a big REA loan to build a partnership generating plant to free themselves from dependence on the state's private utilities for power, a dependence which they characterized as marked both by high rates and by bullying on the part of the suppliers.

The howls about this "socialistic" proposal raised by the Indiana Republicans and businessmen were heard in the White House. Forthwith, Secretary of Agriculture Benson ordered all REA loans save the smallest, screened through the upper echelons of the Department. A bill making REA an independent agency, offered by Senator Humphrey and Representative Price

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of Illinois, failed to override an Eisenhower veto by four House votes, with the result that the Department remained safe for private power.

One of Secretary Freeman's first acts was to restore to REA its autonomy over loans, and the Administration has asked a $100 million increase in authorization for such loans. Recently when a delegation of Indiana farmers representing the state's REA cooperatives came to Norman Clapp, new head of REA, to renew the request for a $60 million loan (largest in REA history) to build their generating plant, Clapp seized the occasion to broaden greatly the criteria which will govern the granting of such loans.

Under Benson the farmers' cooperatives could obtain generating or transmission loans only if suppliers were unable or unwilling to provide adequate power at what the Administration considered fair rates. Now, Clapp says, the criterion will be that "the loan is designed to insure the cooperative device a permanent place in the American power industry." He adds that "as long as cooperatives across the nation are under fire from commercial power suppliers, as long as there are tricky twists in wholesale power contracts, as long as [cooperatives'] territorial integrity is threatened, we are going to have to concern ourselves with the security aspects of each power supply proposal. You [to the REA's] will be pressured into no more unwilling alliances with commercial power companies as long as this Administration holds office." This means, in at least part of the nation, a growing net of public or cooperative generating plants, using fuel and atomic as well as water power, that may eventually approach the "giant-power" concept of Gifford Pinchot and TR.

Under Secretary Udall, Interior too, is pressing again for public-power development. The Bureau of Reclamation is a very large power-supplier, and Mr. Udall has kept virtually its whole career personnel led by Reclamation Commissioner Floyd Dominy. Recently Mr. Dominy made a blazing speech in Wyoming, accusing the private-power industry of attempting to strangle all Western water development.

Former Secretary Fred L. Seaton, only three days before leaving office, had approved a project for a federal backbone transmission system to carry power to public, cooperative and private users from the power plants being built as part of the $1 billion Upper Colorado Basin project. Seaton did this only after long study by both federal and private engineers had indicated it would result in about a 10 percent saving in the overall cost of power to customers, while allowing the project to pay out. The point is important, because net earnings from this power are used to help finance other features of the big plan.

After a re-survey, Secretary Udall has again approved the federal grid. But now the regional private utilities, which had planned a private grid to carry this power commingled with their own, have announced that the federal figures are all wrong, that theirs is the cheaper plan, and that they will fight in Congress to defeat the federal appropriation.

Avoiding Inflation

The main thesis of the latest report of Leon Keyserling's Conference on Economic Progress, "Jobs and Growth," is that much bolder action is required than the Administration has proposed if the economy is to move forward fast enough, far enough and keep moving. The truth of that thesis is attested to by Alvin H. Hansen in his article in this issue, and privately by the President's Council of Economic Advisers, though not by the Secretary of the Treasury – and not, at least yet, by any public pronouncement of the President.

However, one gathers from several passages in "Jobs and Growth" that the one thing needed to achieve a five percent rate of growth is to ensure an adequate volume of consumer demand. This view must be challenged. Once full employment has been reached by appropriate expansionist measures (and we are far from having done that – unemployment has hovered near seven percent for the last six months), a 3.5 percent growth rate in Gross National Product would be sufficient to absorb year by year increases in the labor force and also the labor displaced by automation. If this is so, an increase in demand in excess of 3.5 percent would cause inflation, unless output is correspondingly increased.

But a growth rate in output in excess of 3.5 percent would require an increase in the efficiency of the factors of production – labor, machinery, natural resources. Productivity per worker must be increased from the historical two percent to 3.5 percent, which together with an increase in the labor force of 1.5 percent would give us the five percent growth rate. Increased consumption will not of itself yield this increase in efficiency. What is called for is increased investment in human and natural resources and in modernized plant and equipment. This means that a larger proportion of GNP must be directed toward research, education, public and private investment. Such a shift is imperative in order to boost per worker productivity.

The second matter that might be criticized is the failure of "Jobs and Growth" to stress the desperate need to improve our system of built-in stabilizers. So long as the economy continues to fluctuate as much as it has (especially such abnormal investment spurts in plant and equipment as occurred in '55-'57) the "inflation ceiling" is bound to be hit before full employment is reached. Without ironing out the economic ups and downs, expansionist programs lead quickly to inflation.

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But this does not have to happen if we build into our system an automatic adjustment of the first bracket income tax rate (formula flexibility).

The British Chancellor of the Exchequer has asked the Parliament for power to alter the purchase tax rate cyclically. Sweden has introduced a system whereby private business firms are induced by a tax rebate to hold back a part of their investment reserves by depositing such funds in the Central Bank until inflationary pressures recede. The striking thing is that Western Europe, including the socialist governments, encourage by tax incentives investment in modern equipment far more than we do. And coupled with their encouragement is the administration of these tax incentive devices *in a counter-cyclical manner.*

Consolidating the Colleges

Agitation to consolidate small inefficient school districts has been somewhat more in the public eye since James Conant publicized the problem with his book *The American High School.* Progress has, however, been steady for at least a generation. When Conant published his book there were less than half as many districts as when he became President of Harvard in the Thirties; since his book appeared in 1958 there has been a further reduction from 50,000 to a currently estimated 40,000 districts. We have come a long way toward eliminating the traditional one-room, one-teacher school in which teachers taught the alphabet and Wordsworth simultaneously, and we have greatly increased the number of students who have a chance to benefit from such "specialties" as foreign languages, natural science, and medical and psychiatric attention.

Progress in the public sector of higher education has been almost equally impressive, and even the old teachers colleges are now beginning to offer their students a real familiarity with the liberal arts and sciences, as well as career opportunities outside the schools. But two-thirds of America's colleges are still private (as against one-tenth of our schools), and these private colleges have not consolidated or expanded to meet the growing demands which both the complexity of modern life and the growth of human knowledge make on them. As Beardsley Ruml pointed out in a book which was unfortunately less well reviewed than Conant's, the great majority of colleges are too small to provide decent libraries, a wide variety of subjects, or a well-paid faculty with substantial numbers of like-minded professors who can keep one another alive.

Logical as consolidation, or at least federation, would be for a great many private colleges, few have tried it. Pomona, Scripps, Claremont, and Harvey Mudd have pooled many of their more specialized resources to develop the famous "Claremont Colleges" in Southern California, while Smith, Mount Holyoke, Amherst and the University of Massachusetts have undertaken more limited cooperation in the Connecticut Valley of Massachusetts to provide facilities which would normally be available only in a great university town. Generally speaking, however, good colleges fear that collaboration would jeopardize the special quality of their campus life, produce a sprawling bureaucracy, and undercut local vested interests which everybody is happy to see gratified. Colleges usually consolidate their efforts only when on the verge of bankruptcy.

For better or worse, such bankruptcies are likely to become steadily more numerous in the next decade. In the old days when legislators were satisfied with one or two state universities and a few normal schools, the local private college attracted many students who didn't like the idea of living away from home, or couldn't afford it (even though most public institutions offered slightly lower tuition fees). But today one legislature and city council after another is being pressured by its constituents to support not only a state university, but a myriad of virtually free local colleges as well. The private school which wants to survive can now compete only in the "quality" market, by offering its applicants a famous brand-name.

But not more than one private college in 10 has such a brand name, nor do most of them deserve it. Some pretend that by being small and intimate they avoid the impersonal metropolitan character of the big universities, but this appeal to nostalgia, even when coupled with view-books which portray a rural greensward and colonial architecture, cannot compensate for the woefully inadequate preparation most such colleges offer for life in an industrial society dominated by great corporations and professions. Even at their worst, when they allow students to escape intellectual growth by hiding in the mental suburbia of fraternities, the big universities provide a training ground for junior organization men which the benighted and parochial local college finds it hard to match.

This does not necessarily mean that all small colleges are doomed. A few have national reputations, distinguished faculty, and close connections with the centers of higher learning. But for the majority (especially among the sectarian colleges), the future will be very grim unless consolidation, federation, or some other curb on institutional nationalism does not broaden the vistas they offer their students. Looking at these institutions as they now are one may, of course, look forward complacently to their demise. But looking forward to an America in which almost all higher education is controlled by state legislatures, one may hope that some of these marginal institutions manage to hang together instead of separately.

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Louis J. Halle

Scene: Geneva

Time: A Morning in June

In Geneva the laborer's day begins at seven o'clock. Businessmen and shop-keepers are on the job by eight. The diplomatic world moves more ponderously: international conferences don't get under way before ten.

The Professor, whose mind bears the burden of the Higher Knowledge (plus, if the truth were known, some Middle High Nonsense as well), makes a nobler beginning. At five minutes to eight his wife has at last driven off from the front door, carrying the disorderly pack of children away with her to school. This is the quiet hour when he says his Matins on the flute.

At a quarter to nine he bethinks him at last of the day's work – for which the day will, as always, be too short. He puts away his flute and dials 162 to get the weather report. A center of high pressure (he is told) has appeared over the Azores and will influence the time in our country from tomorrow; for the present, however, the time will rest unstable.

Out of the house he goes, then, brief-case in hand, descending the grassy slope to the lakeshore. Heavy clouds, like water-colors still wet on the paper, hang low on the opposite shore, threatening to break and run down over the landscape.

Far up the lake toward Lausanne, however, the sky has opened out, its blue framed by the stormy darkness closer in. The land up that way is bathed in misty morning radiance from some spotlight hidden behind the proscenium.

The Professor steps off the pier into the waiting *Snark* (which bobs down and up in response to his footfall) and casts her off with accustomed movements. He pulls the cord of the outboard motor, which clears its throat, coughs, then settles down to a steady low roaring. The swan with her four downy young (hatched three days ago) sails up to the gunwale to beg bread and then, just as a precaution, hisses at the Professor. The *Snark* moves forward at first slowly under the Professor's masterly guidance, then springs to life and dashes out into the lake, taking the dabbling coot by surprise. They had not expected her to be upon them so soon. Now they are forced to scatter with running steps over the water, at last taking flight.

The *Snark*, her whole bow lifted out of the lake now, runs over the wavelets with a pattering sound like that made by the flying feet of the coot on the water. Farther out, the lake is covered with swifts, veering and swerving all about, sometimes so close across the *Snark's* bow that only their agility saves them. A kite – talons hanging, wings half folded – comes tumbling down from the dark clouds like a torn cloth kite out of control. It brushes the surface of the lake near the rocketing *Snark* and lifts itself up again, once more in control, now heavily beating its wings.

Across the lake the *Palais des Nations* is a small architectural blot on the landscape, looking naked. From somewhere to the left of it, two great birds have just risen above the land, against the background of cloud. No – by their manner of flight not birds. The Professor identifies them as belonging to the Order *Helicoptera* of the Class *Insecta*. Looking at his wristwatch, he notes that it is already five past nine.

Even for the diplomatic world, the day's work is beginning. The two helicopters come bumbling across the lake, passing over the *Snark* as it parts the waters beneath them. They bear the Algerian delegation from its nocturnal roost in Switzerland and to the site of the Peace Conference with the French Government at Evian, on the French side of the lake. Below are the Professor and the *Snark*, cutting their furrow through the lapping waters, throwing their bow-wave carelessly off to either side, leaving their long, bubbly, disappearing wake for the rebel chieftains to admire. Above are the chieftains themselves: Belkacem Krim, Boulahrouf, Francis, Madjeli, Simane and Malek. Peace be to them, and to M. Louis Joxe, and to Generals de Gaulle and Challe, and to all mankind this fine (but uncertain) spring morning!

As the helicopters dwindle toward the opening beyond the dark proscenium, the Professor brings the *Snark* heeling over in a snaky curve – then, throttling down, into the walled enclosure of the Port Barton. He moors her, picks up his brief-case, gets out and walks up the gravel path toward the main building of the

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Louis J. Halle, *who has taught and written widely in the field of international affairs and served the government for many years as an adviser on foreign policy, has also kept his eye on nature, and particularly birds.*

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Graduate Institute of International Studies. In the trees above him the wood pigeons coo peace.

Upstairs in his office, he looks out the window, up the lake toward the blue sky. The helicopters must be landing at Evian now, in sunlight. M. Louis Joxe (who roosts with his French delegation at Evian) has had his cup of coffee, perhaps also a croissant with jam, and is on his way to the conference-site to meet with the Algerian chiefs. French soldiers with tommy-guns stand at attention as he passes.

At various points in Geneva, by now, the chattering and smiling Chinese Communists, the relaxed British, a peculiar assortment of Laotians, Mr. Averell Harriman, and some heavy-set Russians are getting into their respective limousines to be driven to the *Palais des Nations*, where they will sit around a table to determine whether Laotians, Cambodians, and perhaps all the rest of us as well (including swans hatched only three days ago) are to live or die. Peace be to them too!

Just off the Rue de Lausanne the delegates to the GATT Conference will be meeting in a few minutes to decide whether the GATT is loaded. Peace to their souls too!

In a nearby room Mr. Arthur Dean, Mr. Feodor Tsarapkin, and Sir Michael Wright will be talking about nuclear tests – deciding, perhaps, whether the wood pidgeons shall breathe pure, or irradiated air.

The Professor thinks about the Problem of the Sahara, worrying for a moment over the future of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and all the rest of us (including the swans and the swifts). He thinks about the Problem of Policing the Cease-fire in Laos, worrying for a moment over the future of Vietnam and all the rest of us (including the kites and the coot). Then he remembers that a high-pressure area is approaching from the Azores, so that tomorrow ought to be sunny. With that he settles down happily to the day's work. . . . God bless us everyone!

Our Growth Gap

by Alvin H. Hansen

Federal government expenditures (national income accounts) increased, believe it or not, by $23 billion from 1955 to 1960. In the same period gross private investment increased by $9 billion, and the Gross National Product (the aggregate value of all goods and services produced) by $105 billion.

These data are, I think it must be admitted, rather astonishing. True the figures reflect in part price increases, so that the *real* changes (in quantity terms) were considerably smaller. Wholesale prices increased on the average 1.6 percent per annum, consumer prices 2 percent, and the over-all GNP "price deflator" 2.6 percent per year. Yet after correcting for price changes, the GNP in real terms increased from 1955 to 1960 by $53 billion. And employment rose by 3.5 million.

Increases in government expenditures and in private investment, such as those indicated above, press home a point often lost sight of, namely, that a *growing* society, like Alice in Wonderland, has to run awfully fast to stay in the same place. Indeed we slipped back by a distressing amount. The end of our five year period ('55 to '60) found us with a GNP $50 billion below our historical growth line, and an unemployment rate of 6.8 percent of the labor force.

Even so, our historical growth rate of around 3 or 3.5 percent is, let it be noted, considerably below the more ambitious rates of growth suggested by both Governor Rockefeller and President Kennedy. Yet starting as we now must from a level of $50 billion below our historical trend line, with 5.6 million unemployed and an annual increase of 2.25 million in our labor force, it will clearly take some doing to get back to the historical 3 or 3.5 percent growth curve.

The accompanying table presents the components of our national income accounts which are most significant for growth and expansion. Federal government expenditures and private investment are surely the primary dynamic sources from which come the wellsprings of progress – research, technology, capital facilities, national security, resource development, schools and hospitals, an efficient and healthy labor force. Assuming a reasonably wise use of funds, one can assess the magnitude of our "progress effort" in terms of: (a) federal government outlays, and (b) outlays on private investment. The former is given in Column 1, the latter in Column 2, the sum of the two

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in Column 3, and the GNP in Column 4.

From the Table it will be noted that the outlays in Column 3 (Federal Expenditures plus Private Investment) constitute a virtually constant ratio (1 to 3) of GNP. This relationship is, to be sure, a highly complex one, and cause and effect are not easily disentangled. The 1 to 3 ratio could be expected to change if structural modifications were introduced, as for example a drastic change in tax rates or in the tax structure. In this period 1955 to 1960 the tax structure remained basically unchanged.

But assuming no important structural changes in the economy, let us project a moderate acceleration in the trends of the past five years into the future years 1962, 1964. Let us assume an increase of federal cash expenditures of $28 billion from 1960 to 1964. Compare this with the increase that actually occurred from 1955 to 1960 of $23 billion. Let us assume an increase of $11 billion in gross private investment, compared with the earlier five-year increase of $9 billion.

These assumed increases, represent a relatively moderate acceleration over the rates of increase in the period from 1955 to 1960. Actually, my projections of federal cash expenditures and federal receipts for 1962 (after reconciling the conventional budget figures with the national income accounts) match very closely President Kennedy's recently announced preliminary budget for fiscal 1962.

I assume, as indicated above, a continuation of past relationship between the significant variables – in particular the relation of federal expenditures plus private investment on the one side and the GNP on the other; in other words, between Column 3 and Column 4. We arrive then at a GNP of $558 in 1962 and $618 in 1964.

Where would these projections leave us with respect to our historical 3 or 3.5 percent growth trend? The answer is a bit startling. Our GNP in 1964 would still lie some $50 billion short of our potential growth curve. And while employment would have risen to perhaps 70 million, we should still have around 5 million unemployed after taking account of the growth in our labor force. Assuming no substantial change in tax rates, and applying the 1955-60 ratios of federal government receipts to GNP, we wind up in 1964 with a close approximation to a balanced budget.

Short of local wars (Laos or elsewhere) is it likely that Congress will vote aggregate *increases* in federal outlays of $28 billion in the coming four years? Despite the fact that these figures are not far in excess of actual experience in the past five years, I have no doubt that many will regard them as improbable, considering the conservative complexion of the present Congress. Yet even so, these projections would not give us full employment in the United States.

True, in the happy event that the next four years might favor us with nearly perfect price stability, somewhat smaller projected figures for 1962 and 1964 in Column 3 would yield as good results in terms of physical output and employment as those indicated above. But this favorable eventuality, while certainly not impossible can scarcely be relied upon. It remains to be seen whether management and labor are at long last, under government guidance, prepared to face up to their social responsibilities with respect to price-wage-productivity relationships.

GNP and Dynamic Components, 1955, 1964
(National Income Accounts)
(in billions of dollars)

Calendar Year	*Column 1* Federal Government Expenditures	*Column 2* Gross Private Investment	*Column 3 (1+2)* Federal Expenditures plus Private Investment	*Column 4* GNP
1955	69	64	133	398
1957	80	66	146	443
1960	92	73	165	503
1962	106	78	184	558
1964	120	84	204	618

The not unlikely prospect that the Congress will appropriate, in the next four years, amounts less than those projected in my table, suggests that a politically more palatable program for expansion might well include a tax cut together with tax reforms designed to stimulate cost-reducing modernization of plant and equipment. Such a program would permit a substantially smaller volume of government outlays. Combining all three, however (tax cut, tax reform, and government outlays), the aggregate expansionist push might be fully equal to those indicated in my projections.

From the standpoint of recovery, the effect would be the same, but from the growth point of view, the reluctance of Congress to appropriate funds for much needed public projects would mean a slower rate of growth. Adequate public investment leaves a heritage of social capital – schools, hospitals, housing, power projects, a store-house of scientific knowledge, and an educated citizenry. A tax cut can indeed raise the standard of living in the short-run, but it leaves little or no heritage for the future.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the task of full recovery and accelerated growth is a formidable one. The data covering the past five years, together with the projections into the future based on past trends and relationships, suggest that half-way compromises between the President and his conservative Congress could leave us four years hence a record of moderate progress in the over-all standard of living, but with a continuing spread between actual performance and our historical growth potential.

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What Every Man Knows

Do you suppose she really can make it? The question refers to Mrs. John F. Kennedy and the growing suspicion that she may take us back to the days of Dolley Madison when charm was part of the atmosphere of the White House. The reports in the Parisian and Viennese newspapers leave no doubt that Mrs. Kennedy was a hit, not merely with the street crowds, but with de Gaulle and Khrushchev, with President Schaerf and with the curators of museums and proprietors of restaurants she visited.

This, of course, has nothing to do with the progress of affairs of state, but that is precisely its value. As long as no one suspected Mrs. Kennedy of intruding, all could enjoy her presence and conversation without reservation; and a friendly atmosphere is certainly no handicap to successful diplomacy.

That is what Dolley contrived to supply for 16 years – for she acted as hostess for the widowered Jefferson as well as for her husband – and the memory of it has survived for a century and a half. Nothing so memorable is unimportant, and if Jacqueline Kennedy can reproduce it she will add her name to the very short list of President's wives who have made an impact on American history on their own account.

That list at present is composed of three names, Dolley Madison, Mary Todd Lincoln and Eleanor Roosevelt, for "the fierce white light that beats upon a throne" has the effect of bleaching out all but the most vivid personalities among the women who stand close to it. But a vivid personality can be an asset to the President – or the reverse. Mrs. Lincoln's activities were often unfortunate and embarrassing, but Mrs. Roosevelt's independent status as a great humanitarian unquestionably helped FDR in many a close corner; and Mrs. Madison served well not only her "wither'd little apple-John," but the great Jefferson and the party down to the time of Andrew Jackson. No President's wife since has shared her peculiar talent of charming all sorts and conditions of men and women.

Yet if one judged by outward show, the last person one would pick as the logical successor to Dolley would be Jacqueline Kennedy. One was majestic, the other svelte; one was blandly ignorant – Dolley insisted on a superfluous "e" in her own name – the other as blandly, and highly, educated; one was born in genteel poverty and endured it all her days; the other has always been accustomed to great wealth; one's taste in personal adornment was nothing short of calamitous, the other is the pride and joy of the fashion kings.

Perhaps there is in fact no real similarity and Mrs. Kennedy's gratifying success in Europe was due to a fortuitous combination of circumstances not likely to be repeated. That remains to be seen. But one is permitted to hope that the modern First Lady shares the quality that made her predecessor unforgettable. That quality was genuineness.

There was nothing phony about Dolley Madison. Even in the highly artificial atmosphere of official Washington, where it is as rare for a woman to remain herself as it is for a man to remain what he was down in Guilford County, North Carolina, where Dolly Payne was born, she remained just that – Dolly Payne to the end; and Mr. Madison, Mr. Washington, Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Jackson, the Marquis de Lafayette and M. de Talleyrand were merely half a dozen men and like all men entitled to amiable, good-humored sympathy as long as they did not behave outrageously. Dolley honestly liked people and wanted everybody around her to have a good time. But because there was nothing very much that she wanted from anybody, there was no occasion, or she could see none, for her to be especially nice to one because he was powerful and to another because he was rich. She was nice to everybody and everybody adored her.

Dolley was naïve, but what has that to do with it? There is no known reason why a sophisticated, rich, educated woman should not have the same authenticity. Jacqueline Kennedy has that quality or she hasn't, and in neither case can anything be done about it. But her first European tour more than hints that she may have it; and in that case not only is her husband as lucky as James Madison, but the country has reason to rejoice. For another really inspired hostess in the White House, merely by attending to her job and rigidly avoiding the role of Aspasia, could work wonders. She could soothe the savage Senator, smooth the ruffled ambassador, reinflate the deflated candidate, and make the governmental machinery run more smoothly in a thousand ways.

Incidentally, she might have a wholesome effect on our taste in art; although even she can hardly make Americans appreciate the humor in Manet's "Olympe."

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The Communist Cases

by Alexander M. Bickel

Nearing the end of an exceptionally heavy term, the Supreme Court last week handed down two decisions which, as the Congressional rhetoric might have it, hit hard at the Communist conspiracy. The Court held that the Communist Party, USA, must register as a Communist-action organization under the McCarran Act of 1950, and it affirmed the conviction of Junius Irving Scales for violating the Smith Act by being an active member of the Communist Party. The general impression has been that the Court engaged once more in the familiar task of balancing the claims of order against those of individual freedom, with the result that the liberties of the subject have been diminished. Actually, in the first case, the Court struck no new balance, though it made a very narrow application of an old one. The second case does mark some extension of existing doctrine. But the significant and unfortunate thing about both is that they need not have been decided on Constitutional grounds at all, and should not have been.

The Supreme Court performs three functions in Constitutional adjudication. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent with Constitutional principles. It may validate legislation as not inconsistent with principle. Or it may do neither. The most important and difficult, if not the greatest nor the most spectacular of these functions, is the third, because it makes possible the other two. "The most important thing we do," the late Justice Brandeis often said, "is not doing."

The Court's prestige, the spell it casts as the symbol of continuity and common purpose, enable it to influence policy by entrenching and solidifying measures that may have been tentative in conception, or that are on the verge of abandonment in the execution. There are many measures that the Court should not strike down because to do so would constitute too deep an interference with the political process, too rigid an imposition of the rule of principle. But it is often equally crucial that the Court refrain from validating such measures and imparting to them the legitimacy and perhaps the permanence that its acquiescence can bestow.

All this was brought into focus by last week's cases. The Subversive Activities Control (McCarran) Act of 1950, with its amendments, is a sort of catalogue, with a glossary, of the Red-hunting phobias that seemed about to take full possession of the country less than a decade ago. It has to be read to be believed. It is gripped in a vision of imminent revolution, which is to be prevented by getting all Communists registered with the Attorney General. Then, when we have them all tagged, get them to tell us where their money comes from, take away their passports so they can't travel, or else make them travel as far away as possible by denaturalizing and deporting them. Take away their government, or defense-plant, or labor-union (but not management!) jobs, don't tell them any secrets, see about their tax exemptions – in a word, throw the book at them, and maybe they'll go away.

The Act defines a "Communist-action organization" as any group (other than a diplomatic mission) which is "substantially directed, dominated, or controlled" by (in effect) the Soviet Union, and which "operates primarily to advance the objectives" of the latter. It sets up a board, very much like other administrative agencies, to hold adversary, quasi-judicial hearings for the purpose of determining that a group is a Communist-action organization. When the board makes a positive determination, the group in question must register. Then the consequences, of which the above description is no exaggeration, follow.

Proceedings to declare the Communist Party a Communist-action organization were begun in 1950. There was the usual parade of professional ex-Communist witnesses. By 1953, the board duly declared against the Party, but it turned out that some of the professionals were perjurers, and so the Supreme Court in 1956 expunged their testimony and sent the case back for the board to make a new try. The board did, but this time the Court of Appeals found a procedural irregularity. It was the board's third determination that confronted the Supreme Court last week.

Now, a revolutionary world Communist movement does exist, the Soviet Union does have a great deal of influence in it, and it is quite likely that the Communist Party, USA, is "substantially directed, dominated, or controlled" from the Soviet Union. But it cannot be easy to translate this educated guess into proof. If the government is able to do it, should it not then be permitted to publish the fact and to regulate the Party in one fashion or another? Foreign agents in general are regulated. So are domestic lobbyists. The First Amendment, as the late Justice Jackson once said, is not a suicide pact. Actually, only Justice Black took the position last week that the Communist Party, no matter what it may be shown to be, must be let completely alone, just like the Republican, Democratic, Prohibitionist and Vegetarian Parties. As a matter of expediency, at this

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particular time, this may be a wise course of action, though not one for judges to impose.

For the rest of the Court, the case turned on two other issues. Since, under the Smith Act, it is a crime to seek to overthrow the government, a person may be entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment against being forced to disclose Communist Party membership. Yet the McCarran Act requires such disclosure. This is one of the consequences that follow upon registration, and four members of the Court (Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan) thought therefore that the registration provision itself violates the Fifth Amendment. However, like the other consequences, some of them even more dubious, that depend on registration, the Fifth Amendment question, said the majority, was not yet properly before the Court. Some members of the Party might not wish to plead the Amendment. Or the Attorney General, with whom registration statements are to be filed, might uphold pleas that are made. If he doesn't, there will be time then to litigate the matter.

Of course this is inconvenient, it is untidy and it seems dilatory. Justice Black remarked that it was "unfair," not only to individuals but to Congress itself, to leave this and other questions about the McCarran Act hanging. But the Court could not survive if it was in the habit of actively reaching out, like an efficient executive, to settle issues that are still relatively abstract and that may in the end not need judicial settlement. Congress would soon have enough of such "fairness."

Thus all that the majority decided was that the Communist Party was duly found to be a Communist-action organization controlled from abroad, and that it must therefore register. This is no great shakes of a Constitutional doctrine, and it makes no new inroads on First Amendment liberties. The second important issue in the case was whether even this point needed to be decided at all. Quite aside from what, on principle, the government ought to be granted the power to do, the policy of the McCarran Act is deemed by many to be futile, unwise, downright silly. In the 10 years since its enactment, even some who supported it have surely suffered a certain disenchantment. For the court now, no matter how narrowly, to validate the statute is to breathe some new life into it, at a time when it may have been well on the way to expiring of natural political causes. It should have given the court as much pause to do this unnecessarily as to reach out and invalidate all the provisions of the statute.

As Chief Justice Warren was able to show, there remained in the case at least two procedural irregularities committed in the hearings before the board. They were not crucial. In a case having no ultimate constitutional implications, they would not likely have been deemed decisive. Yet there can be nothing amiss where, as here, the constitutional power of the government to act at all depends on proof of a very subtle factual issue, in being somewhat more scrupulous than usual about the process by which the proof is adduced. To have sent the case back to the board once more, so that the record could be cleared of all irregularities, major and minor – that was the course of "not doing" indicated for the Court in this case.

The reasons for "not doing" were, if anything, even stronger in the Smith Act case, though the way was harder. The Congress that passed the McCarran Act was on notice that in general the Fifth Amendment puts the government to a choice, as the late John W. Davis remarked, between ventilation and prohibition. The government cannot require disclosure of what it wishes to punish. The McCarran Act, as we have seen, requires disclosure of Communist Party membership, though whether it may constitutionally do so was very properly left undecided by the courts. But the Smith Act punishes active Communist Party membership. Congress was in a quandary. Opting in some measure for ventilation, it wrote into the McCarran Act a provision that membership in the Communist Party should not be punishable as a crime. The option was reluctantly taken, and the provision is not very crisp. It is an ambiguous makeshift. But one of the courts' accustomed functions, to which it devotes more time than it does to Constitutional adjudication, is to rationalize such statutory messes if it can, or send them back to Congress for clarification when no organizing legislative purpose can be divined. Such a disposition is especially called for where the alternative is to validate as Constitutional a much graver extension of powers than was ever in question in the McCarran Act case.

No form of words attempting to distinguish "active," "knowing" membership in the Communist Party from other ways of togetherness can quite change the fact that Scales was convicted of an intent to overthrow the government, which was imputed to him from the objectives of the Party at large. All previous cases rested on a showing that the intent was carried nearer the point of action through a conspiracy to effectuate it. Perhaps this difference should not be held to rise to Constitutional dimensions. Perhaps the courts should not foreclose the government from punishing active membership, when the intent to overthrow is present. Nor should the courts, however, lend the sanction of the Constitution to such a policy before requiring Congress to make a clearer choice between the options of punishment and ventilation. The Court very properly declined prematurely to decide the Fifth Amendment in the McCarran Act case. It should have declined in the Scales case to decide the First Amendment issue, so long as the statute did not unmistakably pose it. The result should have been a reversal of the conviction.

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A Crumbling Bastion

Flattery and Lies Won't Save Vietnam

by Adrian Jaffe and Milton C. Taylor

Vice President Johnson's characterization of President Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam as the "Churchill of today" is more than hyperbole. If it was sincerely meant, it is the kind of self-deception that has so often blinded us to truth. And its absurdity becomes immediately apparent when we recall what purposes the United States has hoped to further in Vietnam: (1) a stable, viable and democratic bastion of the Free World; (2) economic growth and a consequent improvement in the standard of living of the Vietnamese; and (3) an alternative to Communism. To these ends, we have given since 1955 approximately $1.4 billion in economic assistance and defense support, and about $500 million in military hardware. In comparison with $13.7 per capita of economic aid given Vietnam in 1960, Pakistan received $3.8 and India $1.9.

As of June, 1961, what has been accomplished? It must be said that Vietnam is not stable, not viable, not democratic and not a bastion. The instability of the government was demonstrated in the recent revolt against the regime in which an elite segment of the armed forces took part, a revolt which required, on the part of President Diem, stern repression and reprisal. The government is virtually unable to maintain security outside the city limits of Saigon. Communist Viet-Cong guerrillas effectively control most of the countryside, and within the past month President Kennedy has felt compelled to offer additional aid to increase the Army by 20,000 in order to prevent a complete rout.

Second, the Vietnamese Government is not viable, except insofar as it uses connivance and force to prolong its life. Nor is it democratic. It maintains a secret police, encourages Vietnamese to inform one another, and detains some 40,000 political prisoners in concentration camps. Arrests are made arbitrarily, detention is indefinite, fair trial procedures are unknown, the safeguards of writs, juries and legal defense are virtually ignored, and almost all law is by edict. Travel inside the country is circumscribed, travel abroad forbidden except upon specific government approval, which is virtually impossible to obtain without evidence of political reliability. The press is as thoroughly controlled as it is in the Soviet Union.

Diem himself has admitted quite candidly to foreign journalists on occasion that democratic practices are a luxury that Vietnam cannot afford. But he has not admitted that the Vietnamese Government is an absolute dictatorship, run entirely by the President, with assistance from his family. Elections are limited to approved candidates, and opposition candidates (Dr. Dan, for example) are either jailed or discouraged from running. In the recent presidential election, Diem was opposed by three candidates, but not one was the leader of a political party or had established a record as an opposition spokesman. In addition, the elections are so fraudulent (Army detachments are rushed to any poll when the issue is in doubt) that President Diem probably lost the election because he only received 63 percent of the Saigon vote. The National Assembly is a pitiful parody of parliament, not only a rubber stamp, but one which is self-inking.

Vietnamese complain most bitterly about what they call "rule by family," which is the lodging of nearly all policy and control of the government in a group of relatives. A checklist of the members of this group sets a modern-day record for nepotism: brother Ngo Dinh Nhu is the principal political adviser of the President and head of the 70,000 undercover members of the Can-Lao organization; Nhu's wife is First Lady of the regime and leader of the organization of Vietnamese women; brother Ngo Dinh Can is Governor of Central Vietnam; brother Ngo Dinh Luyen is the Ambassador to London, Bonn and Brussels; Mrs. Nhu's father, Tran Van Chuong, is Ambassador to Washington, Canada, Argentina and Brazil; and Mrs. Nhu's mother represents Vietnam in the United Nations. Still another brother is the Roman Catholic bishop of Vinh Long.

True, there is little definitive proof of widespread corruption. How could there be, since there is no political opposition to expose venality and there is complete censorship of the press? But the stories are rife. A businessman will confide that he lost a government contract because his competitor made a higher pay-off;

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an intellectual will relate the number of movie houses in Paris owned by Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu.

Nor is Vietnam a bastion. Although Vietnamese troops have been trained by American officers and have American weapons, it is doubtful that the present Army could stave off a full-scale Communist attack from the North, since the North Vietnamese have double the number of troops. There are 150,000 men in the regular South Vietnam Army, 50,000 in the civil guard, and about 50,000 local militiamen, but these forces have not been able to impede the increasing activity of 7,000 to 15,000 Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. Furthermore, even if the troops were loyal, and it is clear from the recent revolt that many of them are not; even if the troops were inspired by a deep love of their government, and many of them, in common with the civilians, are apathetic; even if the troops were violently opposed to Communism, and there is no evidence that they are fired up ideologically, they are not equipped and trained to fight a hit-and-run war in the rice paddies against the Viet-Cong.

Economic Development

What, then, of our effort to encourage economic growth? The system works this way: Vietnamese importers deposit piasters into a counterpart fund, receiving in turn foreign exchange advanced by the US; piasters in the counterpart fund are used by the Vietnamese Government for public expenditures. But in the history of counterpart fund operations, there are two revealing facts: First, of all goods imported by Vietnam under the commercial aid program, fully three-fourths have been consumer rather than capital goods. And, when the counterpart funds generated by these imports were spent by the Vietnamese Government, again about three-fourths were allocated to the maintenance of the Army.

Under the urgency to build up counterpart funds for the maintenance of the Vietnam Army, we have permitted the Vietnamese, with few exceptions, to buy wherever they wish, and whatever they wish. There have been controls, but for legal and accounting purposes only. No one seems to have been too concerned that an undue number of imports fell into the category of luxury items, such as expensive automobiles, scooters, radios and typewriters. In 1958, Vietnam imported $34.3 million in textile products, more than the total imports ($30.3 million) of industrial equipment and machinery. In a country which must develop agricultural output in order to improve its foreign exchange earnings, a total of $5 million in fertilizers and insecticides was imported in 1958, less than the imports of private passenger vehicles ($7.8 million) or petroleum products ($6.9 million). Meanwhile, if the North Vietnamese are following the usual Communist policy, they are making a consumption sacrifice in the short run in order to stimulate capital growth.

As a result, it is apparent by visual observation (statistics on income are so inaccurate that they are meaningless) that American aid has created a *nouveau riche* of importers, contractors, government employees and commercial entrepreneurs. But the broad streets of Saigon, the villas of the government officials, and the luxurious restaurants do not reflect the standard of living of the people. In the rural areas where foreigners seldom go and are rarely admitted, the bulk of the population requires food, medicine, shelter and tools. There is little evidence to suggest that American aid has had an appreciable effect on the needs of these peasants. One American who undertook extensive research in the villages reported that most peasants were unaware of American aid. Of all the statistics that are distributed by the American Friends of Vietnam or the government's paid New York publicists, none deal with the incidence of leprosy, the number of unemployed, or the amount of malnutrition. Yet American relief workers in Vietnam report that the incidence of leprosy is one of the highest in the Orient, that the unemployed are conspicuous on the streets of Saigon, and that the poor filch food out of the garbage cans of the rich.

There is no dearth of other statistics which attempt to prove that Vietnam is in the vanguard of economic development in Asia. But these are purposely deceptive. We are told that rice exports in 1960 reached an all-time high since 1954, without at the same time being informed that these exports are not as high as under the French regime, even when allowance is made for exports from all of the former Indo-Chinese area. We are told that 1960 was a year of unprecedented economic recovery, but the $155 million trade deficit last year exceeded that of the year before.

Even in the narrow area in which economic development has been prosecuted, the US has been guilty of bad judgment and abnegation of responsibility. We know that a devaluation of the piaster would stimulate exports and restrict imports, but we have permitted it to be overvalued by 100 percent because the Vietnamese are concerned lest a change in the exchange rate result in a decrease in American aid. The US allocated 45 percent of all project aid from 1955 to 1960 for the development of highways and only 9 percent for agriculture, when the only real hope for a self-sustaining Vietnamese economy is to increase agricultural exports. We have sponsored such status symbols as a nuclear reactor when government offices can't even afford scotch tape, and an electronic computer when reliable statistics are nonexistent and there is nothing to compute. Instead of promoting an intelligent development program, our basic approach in Vietnam is to sponsor

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a multitude of piecemeal projects in diverse areas in the hope that they will add up to something in the end.

Our third aim, to prove that an alternative to Communism was possible and attainable, has about gone down the drain with the first two. While the Vietnamese Government conducts an unremitting anti-Communist campaign in the press, in its brainwashing classes and over its radio, it presents the Vietnamese people with a social order the effects of which are hardly distinguishable from those in North Vietnam. In neither North nor South Vietnam is there respect for the dignity of the individual. In many respects the South Vietnamese Government is less repressive and in some areas life in South Vietnam is less harsh, but it is a matter of so small a degree that instead of having created an example of non-Communism at work, we have illustrated how inept democracy can be. One of the most succinct and accurate statements of political conditions in Vietnam was provided by an American who lived in the villages for six months. After seeing how life was regimented by President Diem's party, he said: "If the Communists ever take over this country, there will be very little that they will have to change."

When the population sees little difference between Diem's autocratic control and Communism, there is little will to defend the government. Communism may have no positive appeal, but there is also no militant urge to resist the guerrillas. Unless the mass of Vietnamese can identify themselves with the government, no amount of American military aid will hold back the Communists for long.

How Did It Happen?

How was it possible for us to make so many mistakes, over so long a period of time? The answer will not be found by investigating the CIA or by another Congressional inquiry. As a matter of fact, we have had many people who could have given us the facts. President Diem has not been surrounded only by the military, nor have his advisers all been cautious career men in the State Department worried about their ratings. We have sent to Vietnam, in large numbers, men of distinction in the academic and governmental worlds, professors and experts drawn from government agencies and from one of the great land grant universities. There have been some frauds and misfits, but the group has included an unusual number of able men, and there have been few days since 1955 when President Diem has not broken bread with at least one American PhD and on good days, three or four. One of President Diem's personal advisers, paid *mirabile dictu* from his own funds, is one of the world's leading experts in the field of agricultural reform, and the Vice President of Vietnam is learning English at present from an American Chief of Mission. Another adviser, a political scientist with a PhD, has made some 22 trips to the Far East, and has written an article entitled "Vietnam's Democratic One-Man Rule." But never in the history of our foreign affairs have we received more misinformation from a more qualified group.



"It's Beautiful, But We Were Sort of Hoping for a Plow."

Almost without exception, these advisers, experts and professors have told us less than the full truth. To some, no doubt, it has been a matter of not killing the ICA goose and of being sure of another tour of tax-free duty, with servants and social prestige. Others develop an affection for an environment which provides additional money, status and a sense of importance without at the same time requiring one to face the competitive rigors of the United States. With still others, it is a simple inability to see beyond appearances, or an unwillingness to offend, in a university, for example, the hierarchy of deans who might adversely affect future foreign assignments. In other cases, it is a matter of the police-precinct mind, to which all experience is uncomplicated. Whatever the motives, however, there has been unanimous and uniform distortion. What little truth has leaked out has come, not from official agencies and the professional experts, but

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from a few journalists. To illustrate, in the contract between the Vietnamese Government and one US university, it is agreed that no materials, even personal research notes, may be used against the security or the interests of Vietnam. This constitutes a restriction on professional freedom which no university professor, including one who goes to Vietnam, would accept in the United States. When it was learned that an American press was about to publish some essays on Vietnam not entirely favorable to the regime, representations were made from Washington to defer the publication. When the American Embassy in Saigon publishes a news sheet, it follows the censored news of the captive local press down to the last sycophantic panegyric. When the United States Information Agency orders books for a library maintained for the Vietnamese people, it must carefully avoid those banned by the regime, like *The Ugly American* and *The Quiet American*. When the Vietnamese Government prevents students from going to America for university training, because of their alleged political unreliability, our cultural affairs office in Saigon meekly offers the scholarships to the chosen hacks and packs them off to America regardless of their scholastic aptitude. None of the hundreds of Vietnamese students studying in the United States is allowed to travel home through France because of the fear that they may not return.

But these are only minor illustrations. More important is the failure of most experts on Vietnam to publish an accurate, honest appraisal of the economic, social and political facts of life in this country and the flooding of most American newspapers and magazines with false praise. The other side, of course, is the failure to pay any heed whatsoever to those men and women who have returned from Vietnam with stories contrary to the party line. What the State Department cannot see, the university officials cannot hear. Indeed, such returning travelers are often ostracized because it is felt that they have lost their objectivity.

Ngo Dinh Diem

In a Saigon where there is nothing else but politics [President Diem] represents at least an idea of patriotism. He has some words in common with Ho Chi Minh as Catholicism has some words in common with Communism, but he is separated from the people by cardinals and police cars with wailing sirens and foreign advisers droning of global strategy, when he should be walking in the rice fields unprotected, learning the hard way how to be loved and obeyed – the two cannot be separated. One pictured him there in the Norodom Palace, sitting with his blank brown gaze, incorruptible, obstinate, ill-advised, going to his weekly confession, bolstered up by his relief that God is always on the Catholic side, waiting for a miracle. The name I would write under his portrait is the Patriot Ruined by the West.

– GRAHAM GREENE, *New Republic*, May 16, 1955

Is the US Powerless?

We stand at a curious point in history where morality and expediency coincide. The only argument for continuing our present policy, that it works, is nonsense, for it does not. Nor can we be confident that a Vietnamese Army of 170,000 can accomplish what an Army of 150,000 cannot. More military aid might help, but only if an appealing alternative to Communism is created – not the police state of Diem, not a disordered and unregulated economy. We must use our resources not to support lies and fakery, but to push forward a steady democratization of the nation. And *we* must do it. It is idle to say that Vietnam is independent. It is not. If history has catapulted us into a position of power, we should use the power to further democratic aims not only because these aims are worthwhile in themselves but because it is only through their realization that Communism can be kept in check. (In a direct communication to the authors, these thoughts were more eloquently expressed by an Asian, who wrote: "A change must come quickly, or it will be too late. The peasants may be illiterate but they realize that they are being cheated out of their basic human dignity in the name of freedom. If they see little difference between Diem and Communism, are they to be blamed if they don't care who is the winner?")

There is no reason Diem could not continue as President, provided he reforms his regime and broadens his political support. But if reform is to be construed by the Vietnamese people as real and not spurious, at least four changes would have to come about: (1) The family oligarchy must be dissolved with highest priority being assigned to the removal of the Nhu's. (2) Diem must be prevailed upon to release his political opponents from jail, to tolerate their opposition, and to encourage their support and cooperation in the fight against Communism. (3) Certain basic freedoms must be introduced: namely freedom of the press, free elections, and freedom to travel. (4) Economic reform should be instituted by a conscientious effort of self-help, which would include a devaluation of the piaster, tax reform, the substitution of capital goods imports for luxury items, and the undertaking of a national development program. Nothing would be gained by supporting President Diem further if he were to oppose this order or reforms.

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The US and the Caribbean

by Daniel M. Friedenberg

Although the playboy son of the late Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo is, as of this writing, formally in command of the Dominican Republic's armed forces, there is little reason for confidence that he will hold power without challenge. A strong underground is reported operating in the island and some 20,000 refugees, sworn enemies of the Trujillo family, are actively seeking a radical change in the regime. Though split into anti- and pro-Castro elements, the left-wing Dominican Liberation Movement will without doubt take a major part in any new revolutionary attempt and is considered the most militant and best organized of the opposition forces. The young leaders in exile, sooner or later, must move to fill the vacuum left by the assassination of the Dictator.

As a sympathizer in the fight against Batista and Trujillo, I visited both Cuba and the Dominican Republic several times over the past three years, talking with underground leaders in both countries. I traveled by bus into the Sierra Maestra mountains of Cuba in 1958, through the blockade, and stayed at Santiago de Cuba where I was arrested by the Batista forces. I wrote and campaigned for funds to aid the cause of Fidel Castro on my return to the United States.

I can state from personal contact that the attitude of many Dominicans in exile or in the underground today is similar to that of the early *Fidelistas*. And I would like, therefore, to try and review the tragic evolution of the Castro movement in the hope that all of us, Dominican friends included, might learn from the mistakes and miscalculations that were made by the Cubans.

Perhaps one of the major miscalculations was that instead of using Russia to counter US influence, instead of building up a strong 26th of July Movement national party, instead of proclaiming a doctrine of social democratic neutrality for all Latin America, Fidel Castro became an official member of the socialist bloc (a euphemism for Soviet satellites), gave the Cuban Communist Party a monopoly on politics and, as a result, impaired for many years the prospects for effective social democratic revolutions in Latin America.

Apologists say that what has happened in Cuba was an inevitable reaction to US power, in the same way some theorists said that the US would intervene when Mexico nationalized its oil, or that Stalin would destroy Yugoslavia when Tito broke loose. But to embrace this doctrine of inevitability, one must close one's eyes and mind to the realities of Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Ghana, Egypt – even Finland and Albania. The young Cuban revolutionaries brought themselves to where they are now by hardening certain truths and half-truths into rigid doctrine and then acting as though the doctrine were the only truth. They thought that previous revolutionary activity, in Mexico and especially Guatemala, set a pattern which would be typical for all Latin America, and that any revolution which did not follow this pattern was a facade for reaction.

Latin America, however, is enormous and heterogeneous, with many languages and cultures and peoples. Argentina, for example, bears as much relation to Panama as Germany does to Kenya. There are Indian cultures like those of Bolivia and Guatemala and specific white European cultures like Costa Rica and Uruguay. There are miserably poor countries, such as Bolivia and Guatemala again, and countries like Chile and Argentina with a strong middle-class. There are ardently Catholic countries, most especially Colombia, and places like Brazil where the Church is desperately searching for priests. In terms of US imperialism, there are Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and the banana republics, where our financial interests are enormous, and others like Colombia and Paraguay where they are almost nonexistent. US investment declines as one gets farther away from geographical proximity to our borders.

In general, we might say that the areas where white settlement was dominant – Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica – have evolved a middle-class society which more or less resembles the culture pattern of the United States. Another group of countries is still to a large extent Indian and frightfully poverty-stricken – Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and the Central American pockets. In a third group – and that which may determine the future of Latin America – are Indian lands, including Negro enclaves, with a white elite which has to some degree successfully integrated itself into the life of the nation. Here we find Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico. Still another group is dominantly Negro and outside the main stream – Haiti, Jamaica and the smaller Caribbean islands. The race

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question, when all is said and done, is the determinant in many of these situations, not only because the whites have historically been aggressive but also because they settled most heavily in the temperate or mountainous areas where energetic exploitation of the land and resources was easier.

Thus, to generalize from revolutionary activity in Mexico and Guatemala – with their specific cultural, racial and economic characteristics – to all Latin America (and even to Cuba, as will be shown) was wrong. That is why Fidel Castro, who falsely assumed that all other Latins reacted as he did to the United States, is becoming increasingly isolated. For that reason and not "the bloody imperialistic hand of America."

The second mistake was to misunderstand the political structure of the US. It is true that we might technically be classified as an oligarchy rather than a democracy, but the extension of the vote – to the immigrants who have now been largely absorbed, even to the Negroes in the South more and more – has served to modify an oligarchic structure serving only the self-interest of the upper classes. The US is transforming itself too. When the masses in this country care and are given an issue, they do modify the society; *viz*, the ever-increasing income and inheritance taxes, even with their loopholes. By their hostile assumption of inevitable intervention by an imperialistic oligarchy inimical to all radical reform in Latin America, the *Fidelistas* invited the very reaction they inveighed against.

The Price of Dependence

The third mistake of the Cuban revolutionaries was to take it for granted that Soviet aid would be benevolent and disinterested; or at least, considering Cuba's distance from the Soviet heartland, that the resultant influences could be controlled. But it flies in the face of all recent history, all psychology, all common sense to presume that he who pipes will not call the tune. This applies to the US as well, to all creditor nations in relation to debtor nations. The payment to power is service. Economic leverage or "neo-imperialism" – Russian or American style – though not so obvious as political, can be equally powerful.

How Fidel Castro, who well understood that economic domination by the US meant political subordination of Cuba, could not fathom that the same dependence would be the price paid for switching to exclusive Russian aid, is inexplicable. Either Castro is naïve to the point of stupidity; or he intended to become a Soviet satellite all along.

The effects flowing from these mistakes have permeated and discolored the revolution. The young revolutionaries fell into the classic orthodox Marxian error of thinking that what is called democracy is nothing more than a dictatorship of the capitalists, inferior to the naked truth of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Among other things, this led them to underrate the appeal of civil rights in countries with a developed middle class, such as Cuba.

For contrary to propaganda, Cuba was one of the most advanced countries in all Latin America. The US subsidy of sugar prices, though maintained for purely selfish motives, did bolster the Cuban standard of living. Other economic investments helped; the most casual visit to nearby Caribbean islands reveals the affirmative side of American penetration. In all Latin America, only Venezuela, Argentina and Chile rated above Cuba in per capita income.

Indeed, Cuba already had more people grouped in urban than in rural zones, the distinction dividing peasant from industrial lands. Cuban tourists spent more in the US than American tourists spent in Cuba. And by the end of the Batista era, Cubans had repurchased or "Cubanized" from American and Spanish interests 65 percent of the sugar-producing lands.

The memory of civil rights – in effect, of the right to dissent – is strongly entrenched in Cuba, as those familiar with the history of previous Cuban dictators and the many gallant acts against them can testify. In this sense, Cuba (and the Dominican Republic) cannot be compared with impoverished Indian lands like Guatemala. Fidel Castro may have destroyed the middle class, along with the rich, but it is another thing to destroy attitudes associated with it. The defeat of Batista and the assassination of Trujillo are partly attributable to the vitality of dissent, to revulsion against the use of terror to enforce uniformity of opinion.

Associated with this is Castro's reliance on hate to mobilize the masses. The doctrine of hate has a curious way of ricocheting; it can easily turn against its creator. Perhaps more serious, such reliance leads directly to the use of brutality and sadism against those one hates. Once people begin to be treated as symbols in class war rather than living flesh, once hate is substituted for persuasion as part of official state policy, such results are inescapable. And to say that Fidel Castro is still better than Batista is a silly argument: this is not the question. To make an abstraction of the word "socialism" or to defend economic nationalization regardless of techniques employed, means accepting any arbitrary act of a dictator if it is related, or he claims it is related, to this end; it means not only defending Stalin but being forced to defend Stalin if he had been 20 times worse. This is not what the young revolutionaries wanted, but it is where their rigid doctrine has pushed them.

It goes without saying that every war has its casualties. One cannot condemn Fidel Castro for the executions that took place after Batista's fall any more than

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one can protest the Nuremberg hangings; or conversely, to condemn, one must logically condemn both. But there is a large qualitative difference between what might be called revolutionary justice and the principle of the continual purge until all the enemies are exterminated and only those who agree with the dictator are permitted to live.

The worst miscalculation of the *Fidelistas*, however, was so simple it leads the observer to wonder about their fundamental education. This has to do with geography and trade. The US is 90 miles away and the Soviet Union 6,000 miles. The US has great need of sugar, Russia has an oversupply. The natural market for Cuban (as well as Dominican) sugar – even putting aside the question of the sugar subsidy – is the US; its most unnatural market is Russia. It is one thing to admire the courage of Fidel Castro in defying the Giant of the North, but we all wake up the morning after to face the gray dawn. One does not play with the fate of a people out of personal egotism or the obsession to be a Hero; or if one does, then we are dealing with an adventurer rather than a liberator.

This unnatural shift of trade has made Cuba the Puerto Rico of the USSR. In a different kind of a world it might have been interesting to observe two small islands in the Caribbean, one subsidized by us and the other by the Russians, each developing its own economic structure. But this was not the intent of the Cuban revolution.

Can Castro Survive?

In the past week, since the assassination of Trujillo, influential voices have been raised urging intervention in the Dominican Republic "before Castro takes over." Contingents of US ships and jets already patrol the general area. Some of us learn nothing from experience. US blunders strengthened the Che Guevara-Raul Castro influence on Fidel Castro and helped drive him to the mistakes just described. The same stupidity can alienate the leaders of the Dominican Liberation Movement.

For the recent Cuban invasion – from its beginnings to this point – is typical of our substitution of desire for reality when viewing a changing world. In that sad episode, agents in Havana reported great discontent with the Castro regime. This was undoubtedly true, as the writer can personally testify. Taximen, hotel keepers and employees, organizers of "Hot Shows," shop owners who lived off the American tourists together form a considerable element of the Havana populace, and that part most vociferous in its opinions.

From such partial reports, Washington seems to have decided that the *Fidelistas* would fall like a ripe peach at the first shaking – or perhaps the second. This deduction tells us more about the United States than it does about Cuba. It suggests that influential men who shape our foreign policy distrust any force in the world not dominated by their own kind; not only do they fear and hate true Communist regimes, they distrust social democratic forces: a Perez Jimenez was for many years more acceptable than a Betancourt in Venezuela, for the sweet smell of oil.

This may be one reason why the Central Intelligence Agency shunted aside Manuel Ray, Castro's first Minister of Public Works, who is now left-wing opposition leader in exile. Manuel Ray, if in power, might not give back the sugar lands and the sugar mills and the telephone and power companies to American stockholders. The fact that he is the only leader in exile with a strong popular following in Cuba, that he believes in civil liberties and the right of a people to forge its own destiny is apparently insufficient evidence of his "reliability."

But it is only men like Manuel Ray and Raul Chibas who can win Cuba to the kind of democratic ways about which we speak officially with such eloquence. And unless we learn that, $600 million or $1 billion going to Latin America will be of no avail.

The US has many cards to play in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic if it will use them.

To begin with, just as Fidel Castro felt he was secure in taking Russian aid because he could not be invaded by Russian soldiers if a disagreement rose, so he will not be protected from the wrath of his own people by those same Russians if a genuine internal revolt occurs.

Second, Fidel Castro, in distributing arms to the people – probably the first modern dictator to do so – has created the possibility of a Frankenstein. All his tanks and jets and praetorian guard of zealots will avail nothing (as we know from the history of Batista) if the people turn against him with the arms which he has provided.

Third, the topography of Cuba – its mountains and swamps and single long road connecting the extremities – is a paradise for guerrillas. No man can hold the island against the decision of the populace.

This is what men like Manuel Ray have been saying all along. Attrition, resolution, sporadic resistance to keep the flame burning – patient preparation for an internal uprising when conditions are propitious. As the Cuban economy worsens – and it can only be saved by the Russians pouring in hundreds of millions of dollars annually; as the terror oppresses not only the rich and middle class, but also the lower middle class and some urban workers; as the state farms lose their novelty and the peasants find their situation unchanged; as the dictatorship becomes more visible and the people see the influence of Russia and where *Fidelism* has taken them – men like Manuel Ray will have their chance.

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Vicious Circle in Asia

by Selig S. Harrison

Extending economic assistance to the developing countries, says Barbara Ward, "is not charity. It is justice. It is applying to a new world society the fundamental principles of equity and solidarity without which the West could never have surmounted the uncertainties and pitfalls of its own nascent industrialism."

Her plea for a long-term Western aid commitment is addressed in particular to the development challenge in India and to the immediate needs of the Third Five Year Plan. The book begins with a series of introductory essays in capitalist – and Communist – economic history leading naturally into the Indian case study. Western colonialism did not have the sinister simplicity asserted in Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. But neither, on the whole, was the effect of the Western presence and Western investment to "draw the colonial territories through the decisive sound barrier of modernization." Where land and resources happened to be abundant (Malaya with tin and rubber, Ceylon with tea, Ghana, cocoa) a country might have emerged better off from the colonial years. Generally speaking, however, and this was the Indian experience, the West started a process of modernization which it then left in crucial respects unfinished.

True, the British in India did build the railroads and educate a Westernized elite. But they did so for the wrong reasons. In the eyes of the Raj the railroads were an arm of internal security, and education a way to get enough bureaucrats who spoke the language. The result was little or no stimulus to industrial growth. Tariff policy "loaded the scales in Britain's favor" to keep the Indian market clear for Lancashire in the competition with the new textile men of Bombay and Ahmedabad; and in 1939, after a century of British rule, India had an industrial establishment of no more than two million workers.

The planners of the new independent Indian regime set out in 1947 to make up for lost time and have achieved, in Miss Ward's estimate, "a modest but promising success." Her lucid, engaging, at times profoundly eloquent discussion of the economic problems and opportunities confronting Indian planners is without question the best available in book form to the general reader. So is her presentation of the case for a Western aid commitment of not less than $5.4 billion and ideally as much as $10 billion over the Third Plan – "not a minimum sum for a bailing out operation, but a considered estimate of the full resources needed to finish the job."

As she points out, the Indian dependence on outside help in foreign exchange should hardly be regarded as "strange or unnatural"; it is a dilemma endemic to the early stages of growth that, though the machines and the expertise needed have to come from abroad, the economy has not yet become productive enough to pay for them. In the Indian case, one export staple, jute, confronts the competition of new packaging methods, while tea, coffee and cotton textiles face excise duties and import quotas. Iron ore, manganese and light manufactured goods are finding takers abroad, but to cover import needs unaided India would have to increase her exports by 30 percent in the next five years!

India and the West
by Barbara Ward
(Norton; $4.50)

Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation
by W. Howard Wriggins
(Princeton; $10)

The raw nerve left exposed in Miss Ward's statement of an otherwise unarguable case is her preoccupation with justice "in a new world society," her implicit assumption that a tidy world society of settled constituent units has already taken form and that the problem of injustice, with its political accompaniments, can be resolved definitively on the global level. For the issue now being decided is not only one of justice as between unequal sectors of the world community. In a more critical sense men are agitated over the issue of justice within each of a number of unstable new national communities in which historic social rivals (Lundas and Balubas in the Congo or Hindi north and Tamil south in India or highlanders versus the lowland elite in Laos) suddenly find themselves committed to cooperate in the name of a common juridical destiny. The question for the US in confronting a given foreign government, at a given moment in time, comes down to whether it is a broadly-based agency for progress equally shared or simply an in-group dedicated to the interests of dominantly situated caste, tribe, regional or kinship groups. It is not enough to argue the case for righting the general economic imbalance in the world. It is necessary to consider at the same time the balance of social forces within a particular national society under discussion and the policy implications of possible alternative courses of social change.

This is largely unexplored intellectual terrain and no one can blame Miss Ward for choosing somewhat differ-

Summer Schedule

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:

July 17 July 31
August 14 August 28

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue dated September 4.

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ent and equally challenging territory. But one must register protest when she seems to say, in affirming the capacity of Indian society to make the rapid adaptations necessary for stable progress, that there are really no social problems peculiar to India.

Discussing Indian history, she writes that "the Court" did this or "the Court" did that, as if a single polity has been characteristic of the Indian subcontinent. Yet the most compelling fact of Indian history is that, in contrast to the Chinese experience, a unified political structure rose only at isolated historical moments. Some unpleasant contemporary social realities are similarly downgraded. Gandhi, she states, "utterly rejected caste" – making no distinction between untouchability, which he sought to abolish, and the totality of the Hindu caste order, which Gandhi never for a moment seriously challenged. Identifying the peasant who farms, say, twenty-five acres, as the dominant figure in the village – "the backbone of India, the arbiter of its destiny" – she writes that "his neighbors respect and consult him. He probably sits on the village *panchayat* and may be a member of his caste council as well. . . . He must be convinced if his village is to adopt improved methods of farming or establish a cooperative or build a primary school. If he is factious and quarrelsome, the village splits into feuds and dissensions. If he has wisdom and patience, he can put his small community into the way of change and growth." Feuds and dissensions in Miss Ward's India have to do with the factious and quarrelsome fellows one might find anywhere. But in many of the Indian villages which have been studied by social scientists the splits are there from the first; they are literally built into the society; and "faction" emerges alongside caste as a phenomenon of cultural anthropology peculiarly Indian and peculiarly implacable. The most agreeable and amiable Indians, one finds, may shirk from giving their full measure of devotion to the common effort. It is given most warmly to a "community" which is not a local or national political unit, but a caste or regional group bent on insuring in the new democratic dispensation opportunities more equal than those available to the rest.

Howard Wriggins in his definitive study of India's neighbor Ceylon gives searching attention to "the vicious circle of deteriorating relationships" in which "the cries of one community – even if defensive – tend to mobilize the defensive consciousness of the other." Mr. Wriggins, who was recently appointed as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, reminds us of Renan's "fundamental question, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? . . . The people of South Asia are now deeply engaged in a search for their own answers to this universal question." The concept of the nation state, he stresses at the outset, "implies a homogeneity, a unity of sentiment and a way of life that do not yet exist [among] a congeries of distinctive and self-aware groups." This has an obvious impact on the process of economic development, which "alters the channels toward and the distribution of power." Wriggins threads all strands of national life to the fundamental political problem of a plural society. He thoroughly reviews the historical, economic and constitutional context of politics; but he focuses on the conflicts revolving around social and religious differences and the search of the leadership for a foreign policy capable of uniting the nation.

The 1956 election was the turning point in Ceylon's political development. Wriggins shows that the victory of the late Solomon Bandaranaike over Sir John Kotelawala marked a revolutionary transfer of power from the urban commercial gentry to the rural middle classes and from the Westernized to a new generation educated in the Sinhalese language. For the first time, Ceylon's 18,000 Buddhist *bhikkus* were drawn into political combat. Their slogan was "Sinhalese Only," their animus directed equally to English and to the Tamil spoken by the South Indian immigrant tea estate laborers (12 percent of the island population) and by an indigenous Ceylon Tamil group (11 percent). And as Wriggins shows, the back-country monks, literate only in Sinhalese, were motivated also by hostility toward a Colombo elite which happened to be predominantly Christian and predominantly Catholic.

There were specific grievances, such as the dominance of Christians in the administration of educational institutions, but something deeper was involved. The Buddhist revival which had been building up over a period of years was at the same time "a fundamentalist reaction to the city's wealthy ways, a middle and lower class protest against the wealthy and influential elite who had been educated by a foreign curriculum away from Sinhalese social ways and religious practices." In the minds of a growing number of articulate and politically active people among the Sinhalese-speaking majority

Summer Experience

Mayfly over silver water, willow
Fully trailing on the grass a softer foliage,
Natural redwood fence compassing all
Against which roses rise to burst: knowledge
Circles all degrees and finds them good
To leafed-in birds or other unseen creatures
Under rock. No windy shelter or black
Crevice unaccounted for, all merest nature,
As forthright as the sky whose touching blue
Hides nothing but the lesser light of dark,
When, small as insects, stars show plainly too.

Enter: you; the scene shifts everywhere.
With your advent, humid creepers range,
And deviously backed by roses, you advance;
Immensities stretch out and we grow strange.

LEONARD E. NATHAN

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FORGOTTEN

Leota Sundust is one of our forgotten American Indians. She is of the Apache Tribe. Her father died last year of TB. Leota's mother, who does not speak English, works as a cleaning woman. Her meager earnings provide for little more than food and a squalid room for Leota and her two brothers. The children's clothing is worn and patched. Leota's mother yearns for her children to get an education that will prepare them to earn a decent living. She wants them to enjoy a richer, happier life than her own.

PERSON-TO-PERSON HELP

Through Save the Children Federation, *you, your group, your school* can give person-to-person help to a needy boy or girl of the Papago, Pima, Pueblo, Apache, Navajo or Colorado River Tribes. Your monthly contribution of $10.00 will enable an *Indian child, who attends a public* school off the reservation, to have the suitable clothing, personal books, school supplies and cash allowance for school activities.

OPEN YOUR HEART

Your help will boost the morale of the whole family and give an Indian youngster the opportunity to join the mainstream of American life. You will receive the photograph and history of the child you sponsor. The child will correspond with you. Please open your heart to an American Indian child and give him assistance, friendship and inspiration.

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I wish to contribute $120.00 annually for assistance to an American Indian ☐ girl ☐ boy. I enclosed my check for $ ..... and will continue to pay:

$10 a month ☐ $30 a quarter ☐
$60 semi-annually ☐ $120 annually ☐

I cannot sponsor a family but enclosed is my contribution of $.....

Name.....
Address.....
City.....Zone.....State.....
Contributions are income tax deductible.
NR 6-1

in Ceylon, the Buddhist religious culture has come to be the very symbol of a national heritage traceable in a continuous chronicle over nearly three thousand years.

Historical memory can inspire men to great things, but it has served so far, in Ceylon, simply to intensify the Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry. The indigenous Sinhalese "consider themselves of Aryan descent from North India and look down on the Dravidian 'Tamils' with a disdain that includes the fact that the Tamils are often darker than they." Until the elections the hope was that Ceylon's political parties would evolve as coalitions cutting across the language barrier. In 1956, however, Tamil political interests were isolated from the major parties and the communal struggle has hardened along the lines of the party struggle.

Though he does not name names, Mr. Wriggins addresses some pointed comments to those advancing policy views in which "the political context of economic development is usually assumed. . . . Regional, ethnic and class antagonisms are presumed not to contradict 'purely economic' objectives, but, on the contrary, are expected to be mitigated by successful economic growth." In his view the US has yet in its aid policy to "clarify the interconnections between economic development, security policy and political growth. Is it true that economic growth produces political stability? The development of Turkey's countryside in recent years suggests the opposite hypothesis is just as valid."

Mr. Wriggins' caution need not lead to the conclusion that aid to India on the scale advocated by Miss Ward is less justifiable or less urgent in 1961, but it does point to the multiplying questions that may very well confuse the issue considerably in 1965 or 1969.

The Cries of Prometheus

by Gerald W. Johnson

Dr. Szilard's sardonic tales will without doubt be caviar to the general, which is a happy circumstance for the general, since there is no crumb of comfort in them. They are, in fact, the cries of Promethus bound, inspiring, in spite of their wild laughter, terror and awe.

Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi were the pair who went to Albert Einstein with the calculations that had convinced them that the process of atomic

The Voice of the Dolphins
by Leo Szilard
(Simon & Schuster; $1)

fission was capable of producing an explosion of unexampled violence; and that visit moved Einstein to write to F. D. Roosevelt the letter that launched the Manhattan Project. Two thousand scientists and engineers worked for two years before they could translate the calculations into a material object; but for all that Szilard believes it was he who stole Jove's fire and turned it over to man to misuse; and the thought has been the vulture tearing at his liver.

These stories, although they are cast in satirical form are essentially expressions of his remorse, and comment upon a man's self-flagellation is, in general, pointless. One could wish, though, that Dr. Szilard's philosophy enabled him to take a more comprehensive view of the Promethean legend. From the standpoint of Olympus, to be sure, the crime was Titanic, but from the standpoint of mankind it was no crime at all, but deliverance. All that Szilard predicts in these corrosive tales may, indeed, come to pass, but not necessarily. War misuses all power, atomic power included; so Szilard has, indeed, endowed war with a new destructiveness, which is all that he can see. He apparently cannot share the hope of those who hold that war is not a necessity, and power is. His ordeal, accordingly, is beyond the power even of Hercules to relieve, for he cannot imagine himself the heroic deliverer.

His book, threfore, is a strong corrective of complacency, but for those who are seeking any gleam of light, it is a depressant.

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JULES FEIFFER


IN THE OLD DAYS I USED TO GET INVITED TO THESE PARTIES - YOU KNOW - WHERE THE HOSTESS INSISTED THEY HAD TO BE INTEGRATED - YOU KNOW? SO THEY'D INVITE ME.

AND I'D ALWAYS MEET A WHOLE BUNCH OF OFFICIAL-FRIENDLY PEOPLE - YOU KNOW - GUYS WITH STRONG HAND SHAKES, CHICKS WHO HAD TO DANCE WITH ME. IT'S NOT EASY BEING ROBBED OF A CHOICE WHEN THE GIRL IS UGLY.


AND SOONER OR LATER A COUPLE OF THESE CATS WOULD GET ME IN A CORNER AND - WE'D ALL BLOW SMOKE AT EACH OTHER AND BE ENLIGHTENED - AND THEY'D WANT TO TALK ABOUT CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE DEMOCRATS BECAUSE THERE'S NOTHING A LIBERAL LOVES BETTER THAN BEING MADE TO FEEL GUILTY - BUT I WOULDN'T TOUCH IT - I'D TALK ABOUT MY CAR AND BASEBALL AND HOW DULL FOREIGN MOVIES ARE.


UNTIL THEY GOT SO JUMPY THAT ONE OF THEM HAD TO BRING "IT" UP. AND I'D PRETEND TO BE SURPRISED THAT THEY'D BE INTERESTED IN MY PROBLEMS. BUT THEY INSISTED THAT BEING MEMBERS OF THE A.D.A. THEY CONSIDERED IT EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM.


SO I ONLY SAID I DIDN'T LOOK ON CIVIL RIGHTS AS A "HUMANIST" ISSUE. THE WAY I LOOKED AT IT - IT WAS STRICTLY SELF INTEREST. YOU KNOW - LIKE IT'S BEEN A LONG WAIT AND I WANT MINE.


SO A COUPLE OF THEM, HERE AND THERE, GOT RESTLESS ABOUT WHAT THEY CALLED MY "EXTREMIST" ATTITUDE. BUT ALL THE WHILE THEY KEPT SMILING. AS A PEOPLE I FIND LIBERALS VERY GOOD NATURED.


BUT THE PARTY ALWAYS BROKE UP ABOUT AN HOUR EARLY AND I COULD SEE NOBODY REALLY GOT WHAT THEY CAME FOR - EXCEPT ME. I FELT I WAS SUBTLY PUSHING A FASTER RATE OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION. AND I WAS RIGHT.



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RECORDS

Some Praise and Some Warning

Toscanini's are not the only great monophonically recorded performances one must fear may be lost because of the advent of stereophonic recording: another is the *Tristan und Isolde* conducted by Furtwaengler, with Flagstad and Suthaus. An occasion for listening to it again has been provided by the new London recording – A-4506 (mono) and OSA-1502 (stereo) – of a performance conducted by Solti, with Birgit Nilsson, whose Isolde was the sensation of the Metropolitan's 1959-60 season, and Fritz Uhl, a tenor new to us. At the Metropolitan, Nilsson's voice, though without the richer luster of Flagstad's was nevertheless extraordinary in its beauty and power; and one surprise of the London performance is that her voice has the same power but not the same beauty: its *forte* is impressive but its *piano* is unattractive. Moreover it is in quiet cantabile – the second-act duet, the third-act "Wie sie selig" – that Uhl exhibits his inadequacy: his inability to produce the sustained, sensitively inflected line of beautiful vocal tone that Suthaus produces in the older performance. And I might add that in the second-act duet Regina Resnik's delivery of Brangaene's warning hasn't the tonal opulence of Thebom's in the older performance. The singing in that performance is, then, vastly superior; and though Solti's pacing and shaping of the work is excellent, I like Furtwaengler's more relaxed and spacious, and on occasion less frenetic, handling of it even better.

"ON MAY 21 *the Congolese government threatened to disregard its agreements with the United Nations if Rajeshwar Dayal were sent back to the Congo as Dag Hammarskjold's agent. The acting head of the UN in the Congo promptly visited the Kasavubu forces to promise that Dayal would be kept on a short leash, elsewhere. If the great and powerful Congo succeeds in defending its position against the UN, is there reason to hope that the weaker nations, like ourselves, will be similarly inspired?*"

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. R-9, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y., for free copy.

But one important point of superiority of the new version is the much more distinct reproduction of the detail of the orchestral context that is produced so beautifully by the Vienna Philharmonic (I must mention, however, that the off-stage horns in the second act sound at first as though they were on stage). If I give so much importance to the singing in the second-act duet and "Wie sie selig" it is because the duet, beginning with "O sink hernieder," and the third-act music of Tristan's delirium, ending with "Wie sie selig," together with the Preludes to Acts 1 and 3, remain for me the treasurable portions of the enormous work, and most of the rest – the endless narrations, explanations and arguments of the first act and much of the other two acts – I find wearying.

The two records of Volume X of RCA Victor's *History of Music in Sound*, entitled *Modern Music*, LM-6092, cannot adequately document either the composers or the tendencies of this century, and offer their partial documentation of impressionism, with small pieces by Debussy and Falla; late romanticism, with pieces by Scriabin, Strauss, Reger, Schoenberg and Berg; anti-romantic reaction, with pieces by Satie, Bliss, Milhaud, Stravinsky, Bartók, Janácek and Hindemith; 12-note music, with pieces by Schoenberg and Dallapiccola; eclecticism, with pieces by Roussel, Shostakovich, Copland, Rubbra and Rawsthorne (the English origin of the program is responsible for giving to Bliss, Rubbra and Rawsthorne the space that was not given to Mahler, Prokofiev and Webern)

Impressive powers of organization are evident in the completely thought out conceptions of Beethoven's Sonatas Op. 57 (*Appassionata*), which Sviatoslav Richter performs on Victor LM (mono) and LSC (stereo) 2545; spectacular technical powers in the completely achieved realizations of those conceptions – in particular a performance of the finale of Op. 57 that is sensational in its speed and accuracy. But in the first movement of this work I hear deliberately studied achievement of sensational contrasts of soft and loud, which at times force the piano beyond the limits of agreeable sound. And I prefer the largeness of expressive communication of Schnabel's performance. I also prefer Schnabel's slower, more reflective performance of the opening movement of Op. 26; but Richter's treatment, with its animation and relaxed grace, is effective and satisfying in its different way.

The prize-winning pianists get younger; and now it is 18-year-old Maurizio Pollini, the Italian winner of the 1960 Warsaw competition, whom Capitol G-7241 (mono) and SG-7241 (stereo) introduce to the American public with a performance of Chopin's Concerto No. 1 which is made impressive by the technical mastery that includes a beautiful tone, and the lyricism and grace that are controlled by a sure sense for continuity and coherence in the enunciation of melody. Kletzki conducts the Philharmonia, whose violins are made more agreeable by a 10-kc cut-off; the piano sound is thin and metallic in the monophonic version.

Another young pianist, 24-year-old Eric Heidsieck, whom Capitol introduces on G- and SG-7240, is not a prize-winner; and what is more important is that his playing in Mozart's Concertos K.466 and 488 doesn't exhibit the sense for that continuity I just mentioned, sometimes not sustaining initial impetus, tempo, force or style from the beginning of a phrase or passage to its end. Vandernoot conducts the Paris Conservatory Orchestra.

London CM-9266 (mono) and CS-6197 (stereo) have the distinguished harpsichordist George Malcolm's performances of Bach's Chromatic Fantasia and Fugue, *Italian Concerto*, Toccata in D and less interesting French Suite No. 5. They present the music authoritatively and effectively; however I find the harpischord he uses this time too powerful in tone, and his changes of registration too frequent, and I like better the forward flow of Valenti's performances of the Fantasia and the Toccata on Lyrichord 47 and Landowska's on Angel COLH-71. But on the other hand Malcolm's performance of

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the slow movement of the Concerto is free of Landowska's distortions.

On London OL-50181 and SOL-60013 Handel's moderately engaging Concertos Op. 4 Nos. 5 and 6, which we have known as works for organ and orchestra, are performed in what Thurston Dart says is their original form, as works for harp and for lute and harp. Desmond Dupré plays the lute and Osian Ellis the harp in good performances with the London Philomusica under Granville Jones. Also on the record is a Handel Concerto Grosso in C, another engaging work, but one with an excessively long Andante.

And on Angel 35504 and S-35504 are the fine pieces that Beecham assembled from Handel's operas (the notes hint that a few are Beecham's own) and richly reorchestrated for a projected ballet to be called *Love in Bath*. They are played beautifully by the Royal Philharmonic under Beecham's direction; and one piece is sung agreeably by Ilse Hollweg, whose voice is reproduced by the stereo record with slight distortion.

B. H. HAGGIN

MOVIES

Talent at Half Mast

Romanoff and Juliet
(Universal-International)
The Cheaters (Continental)

If Peter Ustinov is ever desperate for a friend, which seems ridiculously improbable, he can have me. Everything I have ever heard about him, seen or read of his, all his appearances as himself or in his personal repertoire of sketches, make it crystalline that he is a civilized, humane, percipient, and amusing man.

It is only the dramatist (as distinct from the entertainer), who falls short. Compare him in *The Sundowners*, where he tried falteringly to act, with his appearance in *Spartacus*, which was a highly diverting Ustinov parlor trick in costume. If only we didn't have to bother with his plays and novels and stories or watch him do anything but his funny business, there could be nothing but gratitude in our hearts that there *is* a Peter Ustinov.

His play *Romanoff and Juliet* was to me a case in point. A romance about the son and daughter of, respectively, the Red and the Red-White-and-Blue ambassadors in a Ruritania, it was tediously symmetrical in shape and was written in a style suggesting overstuffed furniture that has begun to leak. Its sole virtue was that, since he more or less narrated the story, it was often like peering through a toy Easter egg into Ustinov plain. We got a good idea of the tame-bear, sad-hearted, gentle fellow he is; and, as performer, he could often make us laugh by the not-quite-completed way he did things.

Now he has directed a film of the play and has diminished it. Again he plays the President-General of a tiny country, but what was, in the play, a tale told by him has become an "acted-out" story in which he is only a leading character. When he gets room to waddle alone for a while, he uses it to some advantage, but much of the time he is entangled in plot mechanics or is absent. Akim Tamiroff, an enemy of subtlety, and John Gavin, an enemy of everything, play Soviet father and son. The American girl is played by Sandra Dee whose stardom is the result of teen-age acclaim throughout the country; which, I hope, worries the teenagers' parents.

The beautiful Italian location shots seem much too real for the fairy tale; the editor keeps trying to get control of the picture but is always a few seconds behind; and Ustinov's direction is tentative. It is as if the character he plays in the film had directed it.

In spite of all this, behind the fumbled fantasy there is something of *echt* Ustinov. Who is still welcome if he ever cares to call.

Marcel Carné has a high place in the hierarchy of directors, and his film *The Cheaters* – made three years ago and just released here – cannot shake it. But it is an unrewarding film and, from him, a somewhat tired one.

It purports to take us into the heart of young Parisians' spiritual *malaise* – a sort of *Dolce Vita*, Sorbonne Division – but what we get is a series of jivey dances, café chats, and uninteresting couplings. No picture that starts with a dewy-cheeked boy graduate bemoaning the fact that he feels old can be regarded as much more than precocious; and when the film is made by a mature man who is clearly on the outside looking in, the result is a collection of traveller's notes, rather than illuminations. Chabrol's *The Cousins*, which deals with the same young people, is a faulty and somewhat strained film, but at least it seems to have both feet planted firmly in the quicksand.

Intrinsically Carné's directions here, except for brief passages like a game of Truth or Consequences, is without his unique touch. Also, in his screenplay he has used that most fatigued of devices – a distraught person climbing into a car and speeding into an accident. In this case the girl doesn't even have the artistic decency to die quickly. Probably the lack of true Carné melancholy and the presence of oppressive clichés are due to observation instead of involvement. In addition, the picture is inadequately sub-titled. Almost half the dialogue is not translated.

What verisimilitude exists in this film (and in *The Cousins*) arouses in one viewer principally a feeling of presumption by these young people: as if they were despairing beyond their means.

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They are too young to have plunged from anything more than molehills of experience into such deep sloughs of despond. It is as if they had savored the tragic discoveries of Camus and Sartre and Beckett and others and, to a jazz accompaniment, were using them as a facile excuse for irresponsibility and sexual license.

If this sounds stuffy, let me compound it by recounting an anecdote about John Barrymore, a man who really knew something of both youth and disillusion. A friend of mine once took Barrymore to a Greenwich Village party full of students sitting on the floor, drinking wine from jugs, gazing at the ceiling while folksongs were sung, demolishing society, and so on. After about twenty minutes Barrymore turned to my friend. "Whenever I see a group of young people like this," he said, "I thank God that I'm an old —."

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Cuba and the CIA

Sirs:

Amid all the controversy over "The Cuban Fiasco," the basic explanation seems to be the misinformation acquired by the Central Intelligence Agency. But it is at precisely this point that our inquiry should *begin;* not *end.*

During the past year or so I have been served, in my favorite restaurant, by a young man who was born in Cuba. He is a citizen of the US, fought for us in World War II, and loves America. However, his mother and sisters still live in Cuba, and I often asked him what he heard from them since Castro came to power. He gave me to understand that conditions are much better now than ever before. Later, when I read that we were backing an invasion, and that the Cuban people were expected to rise up in favor of the invaders, I was appalled. It now turns out that my information was far more authentic than that of the CIA. Why?

Robert Willman
New York, N. Y.

Halle and the Administration

Sirs:

Can't we get Louis J. Halle back into the State Department – or (better yet) onto a White House private line?

Sam Gadd
Colorado Springs, Colo.

Who Turned the Bull Loose?

Sirs:

"The Superficial Aspect" has never been so agonizing as in Gerald Johnson's exploration of "Who Turned the Bull Loose" (June 5). He dramatizes the essential malaise of American liberalism (Stevenson-Kennedy wing) as he seeks to reconcile his creed with the neurological reflexes of his boyhood. "Freedom riders," he admits, are exercising legitimate rights. But now is not the time. When, pray? As one who only this week had a need for a glass of milk while waiting at an intersection only a short distance from Mr. Johnson's Bolton Street ivory tower, and whose choice was between discomfort and the possibility of an affront to his dignity if he entered a lunchroom, I do not find the question academic.

Richard A. Long
Morgan State College
Baltimore, Maryland

The Trouble of Progress

Sirs:

In "The Trouble of Progress" (*NR,* May 1), Asher Brynes touched on the major, underlying problems of the trade issue as it affects the continued free world leadership of the United States and as it affects our domestic economy. The urgent need for a balanced approach during the coming Congressional debate on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act can only be met by a thorough appraisal of the problems and opportunities inherent in trade expansion.

Trade adjustment assistance, as proposed in S 851, the National Import

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Policy Act of 1961, which I introduced in the Senate earlier this year, provides instruments for ameliorating both the human and the purely economic dislocations resulting from our national trade policy and is based on the realization that the long-term maintenance by trade restriction of "historic levels of production" is not always compatible with United States economic growth and peace leadership. I think that there are certain aspects of my proposed legislation which bear particularly on this issue – providing means of "phasing" out protection for whole industries over a definite time-span; and helping individual businesses, workers and communities, when tariff or quota protection for an entire industry is not called for.

With respect to Mr. Brynes' observations on labor-management-government relationships, I should like to point out the need for local, regional, industry-wide and national productivity councils. I believe that this is one way of not throwing the entire burden of economic change on the federal government – and, of meeting it at the local level which has always formed the basis for American economic success in a democratic framework.

Jacob K. Javits
US Senate

Divestiture Taxes

Sirs:

As a second-generation subscriber and as a Du Pont engineer and stockholder, I must challenge TRB's sarcasm on divestiture taxes (June 12). Let me comment on DuPont's "sin." It helped GM in the early days, investing to the extent of a 23 percent interest. Even with lesser justification, officers and directors of banks, insurance and other companies, pension and trust funds, etc., are commonly directors also of other corporations. . . .

As to the tax aspects of divestiture, my ownership of DuPont stock, mostly received in the thirties in recognition of a lucky process improvement now in world-wide use, *includes* my portion of its GM shares. If, under Supreme Court Order, I am handed a new piece of paper specifically recognizing that fact, should that of itself obligate me to pay a tax? This is an area in which tax law is rank injustice, outright confiscation of capital – a fact Congress recognized by appropriate legislation when the public utility holding companies were "divesting" a few years back.

Ford H. McBerty
Oxford, Pa.

Is *Schmeerkunst* Dead?

Sirs:

We have been rebuked by one of the art magazines – those of us, that is, who applaud the critical judgments of Frank Getlein and who are less than enthusiastic about Abstract-Expressionism. We are accused of saying that the *Schmeerkunst* is dead. In this we are misquoted. We do not say that it is dead; we marvel rather that it is so very much alive. . . .

A function of art is to create order out of disorder. The earlier Dadaists made patterns of old bus tickets; the sculptor Julio Gonzalez created monumental figures out of rusty boiler plate; in our own day Louise Nevelson constructs impressive screens from old boxes and discarded scraps of wood. But the abstract-expressionist does exactly the opposite: from order he produces chaos. A year ago there was an exhibition in Paris called "Antagonismes." Near the door was hung, stretched and mounted in a frame, a rectangle of canvas painted solid black. This marks the spot, surely, where there is only one thing more for Abstract-Expressionism to do – get lost.

N. M. Lang
Vancouver, B. C.

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

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